Political inclusion of marginalized groups: indigenous reservations and gender parity in Bolivia

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Political inclusion of marginalized groups: indigenous reservations and gender parity in Bolivia

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Focusing on the case of Bolivia, this paper analyzes when and why marginalized groups gain access to political power. The country’s experience is puzzling. Though we would have expected the indigenous-led government that came to power in early 2006 to be more receptive to the claims of indigenous movements than to women, the opposite occurred. Indigenous groups received a mere 5% of parliamentary seats and women got a gender parity law. What explains these different results of women’s and indigenous demands for political inclusion? Adopting an intersectional approach, we view marginalized groups not as a single category but as a collection of categories. Rather than a premise of politics, group unity is a political achievement. While women overcame divisions between white, urban feminists and indigenous women from popular sectors to lobby for gender parity, the indigenous movement remained divided over reserved seats and the project of indigenous autonomy more generally. Our analysis helps explain why quotas have brought women into power but not changed other features of politics and why empowerment has produced new hierarchies within the indigenous movement.

Keywords: gender; indigenous politics; minority representation; Latin American politics; affirmative action; ethnicity; intersectionality; multiple inequalities

Introduction

Virtually all of the world’s polities have historically excluded most citizens from political power. In the last decade of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first (and sometimes earlier), scores of countries reversed this trend. In response to the claims of oppressed groups, emerging international norms, and changing standards of democratic legitimacy, they adopted candidate quotas in parties, reserved parliamentary seats, new districting arrangements, and other mechanisms to improve the diversity of elected legislatures. Historically excluded social groups – whether defined by gender, ethnicity, race, caste, religion, or other markers – confront a political context seemingly more receptive to their demands for inclusion than ever before.

Many distinguished scholars have offered theoretical justification and empirical explanation of these trends (see, for example, Young 1990; Williams 1998; Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Dahlerup 2006, 2008; Krook 2009; Krook and O’Brien 2010; Reynolds 2005). Others have analyzed whether quotas and other institutional interventions actually improve the political presence of excluded groups (see, for example, Jones 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Tripp and Kang 2008) and the conditions under which their participation in political office leads to legislative advocacy of group interests (see, for example, Swers 2002;
Yet the majority of works neglect to focus on the similarities and differences between groups. Yet excluded groups – whether constituted by gender, race, class, ethnicity, and so on – equally likely to get guarantees of political presence? Do their demands compete with – or complement – one another? What factors shape the chances for group success and are these the same or different across groups?

We focus on the case of Bolivia, a country that applies both a gender parity law and reserved seats by ethnicity. The country’s experience is puzzling. As is well known, the first (self-identified) indigenous president was elected in 2005 and re-elected in 2009. Evo Morales and his party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism, or MAS), have defended indigenous interests. After assuming office, Evo appointed people of indigenous descent to cabinet positions and required state officials to speak one of three indigenous languages (Aymara, Quechua or Guarani) (Albró 2006, 210). He presided over a constitutional convention and adoption of a new constitution that upholds numerous indigenous rights, including collective land rights, political and legal autonomy, and control over natural resources (República de Bolivia 2009, Article 30). The national development plan promotes universal health care and income supports while showcasing indigenous cosmovision – including the Andean principle of “living well” – as the paradigm for state policy (Johnson 2010, 143).

Yet the MAS rejected a central demand of indigenous movements. They had requested 36 reserved seats in parliament: one for each pueblo (or people) recognized by the constitution. In the end, the electoral law approved by the MAS-dominated legislature guaranteed a mere seven seats to indigenous groups, one-fifth of the number originally proposed and a mere 5% of the total seats in the lower house of congress.

When it came to women, the opposite occurred. In spite of its machista tendencies, the MAS adopted and applied a parity rule leading to the political inclusion of record numbers of women. Then, the Congress approved laws to establish parity between men and women in the national electoral court, the state electoral courts, the Constitutional Court and the selection of leaders in autonomous indigenous regions. Though not all of the party caucus agreed, and women deputies had to struggle against recalcitrant male legislators to get the rules adopted, the remarkable parity provisions were adopted without roadblocks, strikes, or intimidation.

Bolivia’s indigenous-led government guaranteed indigenous peoples a mere 5% of parliamentary seats while women got a gender parity law granting them 50% of positions on candidate lists. Why was Evo Morales’s government stingy in its response to the demands of indigenous movements for greater political inclusion? How were women able to convince the government to approve a gender parity law? Wasn’t it supposed to be the other way around? Did women get more representational rights than indigenous groups by accident, or does Bolivia’s experience imply more general conclusions about the empowerment of marginalized groups and their struggle for inclusion?

This paper proposes an approach to unravel the Bolivian puzzle and, more generally, to analyze the comparative politics of inclusion. Following theories of intersectionality, we highlight differences and disagreements within marginalized groups and the potential for intra-group conflicts of interest. Arguing that shared membership in a group is not sufficient to guarantee mobilization, we demonstrate that group success depends in part on the ability to overcome differences and forge a common political strategy. In addition, our approach links intra-group dynamics to institutional factors and party interests. Excluded groups tend to demand logically-appropriate, but differing, institutional changes to promote their inclusion (Htun 2004). Parties are not agnostic vis-à-vis these policies. Inclusion mechanisms that further – or at least fail to jeopardize – party
interests in gaining power will be more acceptable than those that pose a threat to the party’s position.

Armed with this approach, we identify three factors behind Bolivia’s endorsement of gender parity and rejection of (a significant number of) ethnic reservations:

1. The relative unity of the women’s movement and disunity of the indigenous movement. The women’s movement overcame the historic division between urban feminists and women from indigenous, popular sectors to unite around the goal of parity in congress and other arenas of public decision making. The indigenous movement was divided in its support for reserved seats.

2. Gender parity is a majority issue affecting all women; indigenous reservations pertain to a disadvantaged subgroup of indigenous peoples. Though parity in electoral lists and public institutions affects (or has the potential to affect) all women, indigenous reservations were designed for numerically small and rural groups.

3. Inclusion through quotas or parity on party lists is more acceptable to a party than the reservation of seats in parliament. Candidate quotas or parity allows parties to bring in women as individuals, to dilute their group strength by partisan divisions, and to control them through the sanctions and incentives inherent in the nomination process. Legislative reservations give indigenous groups access to power independent of mainstream parties.

Our analysis considers the adoption of quotas, parity, or reserved seats to be an indicator of political inclusion (a term we use interchangeably in this paper with “representational rights” and “guarantees of political presence”). Yet it is important to recognize that the concept of political inclusion is broader, referring not just to the political presence of members of historically excluded groups but also the degree to which their perspectives are taken into account in public decision making and the adoption of policies advancing group interests. Though group presence may promote group influence, other factors also matter, including advocacy by civic organizations and social movements (Weldon 2011; Strolovitch 2007), the mobilization of “mini-publics” (Fung 2003), and the creation of specialized government agencies (such as gender machineries) (McBride and Mazur 2011). Some scholars argue that social movements are the best vehicles to represent the perspectives of subordinate groups and effective catalysts of policy change (Weldon 2011; Htun and Weldon 2012). As this suggests, political inclusion is a complex phenomenon captured only partially by this article’s focus on access to elected office.

Intersectionality, institutions, and inclusion

The first step in our approach is to adopt an intersectional perspective on marginalized groups. Intersectionality maintains that social differences and inequalities are not reducible to a single axis (such as class, gender, race, or ethnicity). Hierarchies of domination are multiple and mutually constitutive. They shape the experiences and life chances of individuals and groups, though not in a simple additive or even multiplicative way. A person can be simultaneously marginalized and privileged by the intersecting structures of class, race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. Social groups and individuals are fundamentally hybrid (see, for example, García Bedolla 2007; Hancock 2007; Jordan-Zachery 2007; Nash 2008; Weldon 2008, 2011).

By calling attention to the differences and inequalities that exist within marginalized groups, intersectionality reveals that neither “women” nor “indigenous” is a single category. “Women,” rather, is a collection of categories including “white women,” “mestiza women,” “rich women,” “poor women,” “old women,” “lesbian women,” and so forth. “Indigenous” is a diverse category encompassing thousands of distinct groups, which in Latin America include
speakers of a few hundred different languages, highland and lowland dwellers, rural and urban residents, different class backgrounds, and people with varying identities. Far from the premise of politics, the unity and coherence of these categories is a political achievement. To the extent that either women or indigenous peoples mobilize collectively, it is because of the political work they have done to overcome the potentially divisive effects of their other differences. As Crenshaw (1991, 1299) puts it in another context, “intersectionality provides a basis for reconceptualizing race as a coalition between men and women of color.” For women to be politically effective, they must forge a coalition: simply being women is insufficient grounds for political action. The global movement against gender violence, for example, was able to present a united front only after developing special strategies to overcome divisions of national identity, wealth, and language (Weldon 2006).

Intersectionality implies that due to their diverse social positions, different sectors of marginalized groups may have different interests. Though some issues may affect all members of a marginalized group, other issues are more relevant to their disadvantaged and/or advantaged subgroups (Crenshaw 1991; Strolovich 2007). The number of constituents affected by an issue is directly related to the attention that advocacy organizations devote to it. Organizations promoting the interests of marginalized groups therefore have a tendency to promote issues affecting the majority of members more than those issues affecting only disadvantaged subgroups. Feminist groups in the United States, for example, are more likely to work on violence against women (a majority issue) than on welfare reform (an issue affecting primarily poor women) (Strolovitch 2007, 93–95).

Intra-group divisions help account for differences in the interests and the priorities of advocacy organizations. Explaining the adoption of policies to address marginalization and inequality, however, requires an additional analytical step. Groups do not advance their demands in a vacuum but in the context of already-existing political institutions. They achieve their policy goals when they can take advantage of points of access and leverage. We must, therefore, examine the relative opportunities that political institutions offer to differently constituted groups and different types of claims (and deny to their competitors and opponents) (cf. Skocpol 1992, 54–57; Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000; Amenta et al. 2010, 298–300).

In this paper, we argue that parties have inherent interests that shape their positions vis-à-vis policies to promote the inclusion of historically marginalized groups. Our argument rests on two widely accepted propositions about parties. First, they are the primary agents of representation and hold a monopoly on access to elected office (with some exceptions) (see, for example, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 2). Second, parties are oriented toward the goal of electoral victory (Schlesinger 1984, 383–384). As Downs (1957, 25–28) puts it, they are “teams” seeking to win elections, a goal that subordinates other objectives. This implies that parties are unlikely willingly to engage in behavior that jeopardizes their ability to hang on to power.

Party interest in electoral victory implies a preference for candidate quotas over reserved parliamentary seats. Why? Candidate quotas, a policy that is logically appropriate for groups that cross-cut partisan divisions, are a mechanism to promote individuals from the bottom of party ranks to electable positions on candidate lists (Htun 2004). As long as parties control the nomination process, candidate quotas involve the mere addition of individuals of a different sex, race, or ethnicity to party lists. While threatening to some of those individuals occupying top positions, candidate quotas pose little threat to the party as a whole. The included group is weakened as it is divided across party lines. And, through nominations, party leaders have the power to impose sanctions and offer incentives to shape the behavior of members of the recently included group.

Reserved seats – provided they are filled by election from special districts or separate voter rolls – enable groups to gain access to power independently of existing parties (Htun 2004).
Logically appropriate for groups whose boundaries coincide with partisan divisions or who form their own party, legislative reservations may involve changing the size of parliament, the number of seats elected per district, the relative weight of proportional and majoritarian contests (in mixed systems), and other structural features of an electoral system. As a result, reserved seats may threaten existing parties’ share of seats, alter the proportionality between votes and seats, give small parties coalition (or blackmail) potential, and otherwise alter the partisan balance of power. Rather than impose adjustments within individual parties, they produce changes that alter relations across parties, potentially to the detriment of the party in power. As a result, rational parties will be less receptive to claims for reserved seats than to candidate quotas. *Ceteris paribus,* groups demanding quotas are more likely to succeed than groups demanding reserved seats.

Our approach forms part of a growing body of work that highlights the varying ways that different groups gain access to politics, a challenge to earlier literature that assumed that the mechanisms behind the inclusion of women and minorities were similar (see, for example, Lijphart 1999). Htun (2004) shows that, across electoral democracies, women tend to demand and receive candidate quotas in parties while ethnic groups prefer and are granted reserved parliamentary seats, a pattern that holds in the Bolivian case we examine in this paper. Moser and Holmsten (n.d.) argue that, whereas women benefit from party systems emphasizing *depth,* politically mobilized ethnic groups tend to do better in party systems that prioritize *breadth.* Hughes’s (2011) study of some 80 countries found that guarantees of group representation benefit some subgroups while hurting others.

Our work differs from other contributions in one key respect: our arguments apply to claims and strategies for inclusion, not specific groups (such as women or indigenous peoples). Though group features imply a better fit with some representational policies than others (Htun 2004), this relationship is not fixed in stone. Conforming to regional and historical repertoires of group representation, women have demanded and received reserved seats in parliament and some parties and governments have applied ethnic candidate quotas (Krook and O’Brien 2010). It is not the type of group that drives the diverse outcomes we analyze but its co-operation amidst diversity, the mobilization of a political strategy, and the “fit” (or lack thereof) with prevailing political institutions, particularly parties.

**The struggle for gender parity**

Historically divided along class, ethnic, regional, and other lines, Bolivian women united to demand parity in access to decision making. How did this coalition come about? As this section shows, the MAS’s electoral successes in 2005 and 2009 helped forge greater connections between the urban feminist movement and women from indigenous and popular sectors. Sex discrimination by the government and gender-based political assault caused women to recognize their shared position of disadvantage. Urban feminists began to forge links with indigenous women and indigenous women began to assume an increasingly assertive stance on women’s rights *vis-à-vis* the men in the MAS and other organizations.

**Divisions among “women”**

In the 1990s and early 2000s, middle class, urban feminists were largely unconnected to the social base of the MAS and few indigenous women participated in their movement. For their part, few indigenous women advanced feminist claims. In 1997, the feminist movement convinced the Bolivian Congress to adopt a gender quota law requiring that women make up 30% of candidates in proportional elections (but not all elections). Pushed by feminist non-governmental organizations (NGOs), women in congress, and the Subsecretariat for Gender Issues (part of the Ministry
of Human Development), the pro-quota advocacy movement consisted of urban elites with connections to international development agencies and to elected officials: “it was not a demand emerging from mass society but rather from a small group of women … intellectuals from the middle classes.”12 The “Women’s Political Forum” (Foro Político de Mujeres) spent one year practically living in congress to lobby politicians; they held seminars and workshops around the country; they campaigned the press and other media; and they even distributed propaganda with popcorn at a soccer match.13 They convinced traditional elites and parties to endorse quotas, including then-president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (who was completing his first term).14 Indigenous and popular sector women did not participate in this coalition, though several were elected to Congress in the 2002 elections thanks to the quota.

The initial results of the quota law were disappointing. Women’s presence in the lower house of Congress rose by only three percentage points in the 1997 elections (from 8% to 11%). Women made up 18% of those elected from proportional representation (PR) lists but only 3% (two seats) from the single member districts (SMD). Most of the parties complied with the quota law by nominating women as alternates (suplentes). In the 2002 elections, the results improved and women made up 18% of those elected to the lower house, including 26% from the PR lists and 13% from the SMDs (Baldez and Brañez 2005).15

This tradition of elite women’s organizing was largely unconnected to the rise of radical movements and the growth of the MAS. Most of the relationships between urban feminists and popular sector (or lower-class), indigenous women stemmed from NGO service provision or gathering data for studies (Monasteiros 2007, cited in Rousseau 2011, 13). According to a former deputy and former minister, movements of indigenous women did not advocate an end to gender discrimination. Instead, their main concerns were the eradication of poverty and the protection of usos y costumbres.16 Another analyst predicted that if indigenous peoples gained more national power, the movement for gender equality would suffer a setback.17

According to urban feminists we interviewed, indigenous women did not share the demand for gender quotas and their communities lacked a concept of discrimination and affirmative action.18 During our interview, one NGO leader waved her hand around the office and said, “There aren’t any indigenous women here. We live in parallel worlds. But we should make hiring them a priority.”19 These urban activists expected, however, that their work on behalf of women’s rights would benefit their indigenous counterparts. As another activist put it: “when we are demanding women’s rights, we are demanding the rights of indigenous women.”20

Indigenous women we interviewed around the same period readily acknowledged the gender hierarchies in their communities. A vice-presidential candidate from the 2002 elections affirmed that the male leadership of peasant unions was sexist (machista). They relied on women’s work but refused to cede them any power. As a result, the vast majority of indigenous women rarely spoke in public or engaged in autonomous political action, whether on national issues or in civic organizations.21 A former Vice Minister for Indigenous Affairs added that: “Women are the majority in the marches but when it comes to decision time, men make all the decisions.”22

Interviewees also noted that indigenous women had largely neglected to organize around gender discrimination. According to a former Vice Minister for Women, who was the first indigenous person to lead a state women’s agency, women had always played a part in indigenous struggles and organizations but they had not developed their own movements as women. One important exception is the Bartolina Sisa Federation, a peasant women’s union formed in 1980. Yet, until the late 2000s, the Bartolinas and other base organizations had little contact with the “Western” feminist movement and did not assume feminist goals, such as political inclusion and reproductive rights. Their connection to the male-dominated peasant and workers’ unions had precluded alliances with “whites.” Our interviewee believed at the time that “cultural divisions are more pronounced than gender solidarity.”23
“Women” as a coalition of urban and indigenous feminists

The assumption of power by the MAS created several incentives for these different groups of women to co-operate. As scholars have pointed out, a common experience of discrimination and exclusion often helps to forge a political identity among diverse groups of people (Friedman 2000; Baldez 2002; Jung 2008). The government demonstrated strong machista tendencies and took measures that denied the importance of women’s rights. At the same time, rising reports of gender-related political assault fortified gender solidarity.

After assuming office in 2006, Evo’s government demoted the Gender Subsecretariat created in the 1990s to a “Directorate on Gender and Generational Violence” under the Vice Ministry for Equal Opportunities. Vice President García Liñera had said that the MAS intended to “transversalize” gender throughout the government, arguing that, like indigenous peoples, women were not a minority and so their issues could be not relegated to one ministry.24 Yet feminists pointed out that gender had not been mainstreamed. Though virtually every government policy and agency focused on indigenous issues, only three of 20 ministries had created gender-related focal points or programs.25

Under the MAS government, gender equality did not receive the same emphasis as indigenous rights. Rather than an important cause on its own, gender equality was largely subsumed to the decolonization of the state. Official discourse held that once ethnic oppression was eliminated, patriarchy would erode. The national development plan, for example, assumed that gender inequality – and other inequitable relations of power – would be automatically resolved once colonialism had been eradicated.26

Much of the MAS’s male leadership – especially the president – displayed little awareness of gender discrimination. President Morales is notorious for making insensitive and even sexist comments in public. There are other complaints that, if not explicitly sexist, other leaders of the governing coalition were insensitive to issues of gender discrimination. One female deputy recalled that:

The Movement toward Socialism is not exactly linked to a feminist movement or a recognition of gender. It is an indigenous project that hasn’t really looked at gender issues. As a result, it’s difficult for a parliamentary group dominated by men to understand our issues and even more to see them as real problems. I’ll give you an example from a congressional debate on the [proposed] law on gender-based political assault. It had already been largely discussed and approved. When we were in the process of approving it one of my male colleagues [compañeros] turned to me and asked why we hate men so much.27

In this context, the convening of a constituent assembly in 2006 – fulfillment of a campaign promise – offered a chance for women to mobilize to press for greater recognition of their rights. In spite of a history of distance and even mistrust, urban feminist groups believed it critical to link their demands to those of the indigenous movement (Novillo 2011, 36–37). Convened under the umbrella of Women Present in History (Mujeres Presentes en la Historia), more than 25,000 women, from rural indigenous groups to urban intellectuals, organized a network of workshops to formulate a joint proposal for the assembly (39). Parity on party lists was a central demand. Meanwhile, proposals from the Bartolina Sisa peasant women’s union included the demand for parity in presence in Congress, parties, and all decision-making bodies, as did the platform developed by the united front of all indigenous groups, the Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact).28 Women delegates, who comprised one-third of the constituent assembly, organized under the leadership of the Assembly’s President, an indigenous woman, to present a joint platform on women’s rights and co-ordinated their lobbying work (Rousseau 2011, 12–13).29
Urban feminists and indigenous women had different philosophical reasons to support gender parity. For indigenous women, it flowed from a concept of complementarity between the sexes. In many Andean cultures, the union of a man and a woman – the *chachawarmi* in Aymara (*qhari-warmi* in Quechua) – constitutes the basic social, moral, and economic unit of society. Men and women are not considered full members of their community until they enter into such a union. Far from endorsing women’s isolation in the home, complementarity implies that sexual dualism should be present in all spheres, including public decision making (Rousseau 2011, 17–18). For urban feminists, by contrast, parity in decision making was implied by principles of equal rights and was the logical next step given their history of advocacy for gender quotas (Mokrani and Uriona 2009).

Women disagreed about other issues, such as abortion. Indigenous women’s organizations, including the Bartolina Sisa peasant federation, were opposed to elective abortion (Rousseau 2011, 18). As a result, the Women Present in History coalition’s platform called only vaguely on the state to “guarantee sexual and reproductive rights” and the September 28th Campaign (for the legalization of abortion) strategically dropped the abortion issue (Movimiento de Mujeres Presentes en la Historia 2007, 7; Rousseau 2011, 23).30

The Constitution – approved after a process fraught with conflict31 – codified numerous women’s rights, including guarantees of equality in elections to congress; freedom from violence; protection during pregnancy; equal pay for work of equal worth; protection from employment discrimination for reasons of pregnancy, civil status, age, or physical traits; reproductive and sexual rights (without defining what these are); and equal access to land in indigenous communities (República de Bolivia 2009). Yet the text did not specify exactly how equality in political participation would be implemented. Article 147 merely stated: “equal participation of men and women will be guaranteed in the election of legislators.” Congress had a 60-day window to approve a temporary electoral law implementing various constitutional provisions, including gender parity and indigenous seats.

The process of electoral reform in 2009 and 2010 provided another incentive and opportunity for women to co-operate, revealing the common obstacles women faced, such as hostility by male partisan colleagues and harassment of elected female officials. Feminist groups from civil society and an alliance of women in congress campaigned for a parity law with public demonstrations, media interventions, and lobbying in congress. They encountered sexist remarks and hostility from male legislators who removed the proposal from the electoral law at one point (Novillo 2011, 47–58).

In addition to alternation on party lists, women politicians wanted the electoral law to address the phenomenon of gender-based political assault, on the rise in Bolivia as women’s opportunities for participation expanded. Women elected officials have been the target of harassment, public humiliation, and even death and kidnapping threats to pressure them to resign from their office so that their posts could be assumed by a male alternate [*suplente*]. In some cases, the *suplente* himself organized the campaign of intimidation; in others, women were forced to sign an undated resignation letter before assuming office.32 Between 2000 and April of 2011, the Bolivian Association of Women City Councilors recorded 572 episodes, many of which involved threats and pressures on female elected officials to resign their positions.33 Women politicians believed that tightening the procedures surrounding political resignation – essentially by requiring that officials resign in person at an electoral court and not in writing or in their communities – would curtail the opportunities for gendered political assault.

When it looked like the tide was turning in Congress against gender parity, indigenous women took action. Senator Leonida Zurita, a leader of the Bartolina Sisa women’s peasant union and internationally known advocate of indigenous rights, gathered the women legislators together. According to our interviewee who was present at the meeting, she scolded women who had
failed to support the cause of parity and called on an indigenous woman in traditional dress (de pollera) – to speak on behalf of the proposal. When the plenary session resumed, the intervention of Cristina Rojas proved a turning point. Our interviewee reports that:

It was decisive because the men were indigenous originary peasants too [indígenas originarios campesinos] … so they listened to her and agreed. If one of us had spoken, as the urban women we are, they would not have listened and we would have ended up with nothing. 34

The temporary electoral law approved by Congress in 2009 neglected to use the term “parity,” referring instead to “equality of opportunities” between women and men and requiring that they alternate on party lists and in the titular-alternate formula in single-member districts. To promote implementation, the feminist movement organized a massive campaign – Women Ready for the Lists (Mujeres Listas para las Listas) – directed at parties and citizen awareness, in which important blocks of the indigenous movement also participated.35

Notwithstanding these efforts, parties complied with the parity law in a minimalist manner, conforming to a common tendency in Latin American elections (Jones 2009). Of the 1046 candidates that were registered to compete, 494 were women, but only 179 women were placed as titular candidates. The rest were alternates.36 Though the law led to the election of record numbers of women (Table 1), the vast majority came from PR lists. 47% of PR deputies were women, compared to merely 11% of deputies elected in single-member districts, and none of the candidates elected from the seven indigenous districts was a woman.

In 2010, the newly elected Congress discussed and adopted a permanent electoral law whose provisions reflected the strength and influence of the coalition of women. To preclude parties from exploiting loopholes and nominating women as suplentes, the new law required that 50% of the titular candidates in all the single member districts nominated by each party be women. In addition, the law recognized gender-based political assault as an electoral crime, with sentences of up to five years of prison. Finally, the law established that the principle of parity also covers reserved indigenous districts.37 In addition to elections, congress approved laws to establish parity between men and women at the Electoral Tribunal, the Judicial Branch, the Constitutional Court and the selection of leaders in autonomous indigenous territories.38

Meanwhile, at the beginning of his second term, Evo attempted a new start on the issue of gender. Under pressure from the Bartolina Sisa women’s union, in a move he described as a homage to his mother, sister, and daughter, the President appointed women to ten (half) of the cabinet positions. Though the president of the indigenous federation CONAMAQ complained that the cabinet lacked any indigenous participation, the photos of the new ministers clearly show that at least two of the female ministers are indigenous.39 The title of a newspaper article similarly referred to women’s inclusion while denouncing indigenous exclusion. These critical comments reveal that, while women bridged the cultural divide and forged a coalition to combat shared disadvantages, indigenous peoples are divided, including about who counts as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quota (% of candidates who must be women)</th>
<th>Women as a percentage of elected Senators</th>
<th>Women as a percentage of elected Deputies</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
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Source: Corte Nacional Electoral Bolivia; Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database.
indigenous. As we explain below, these divisions precluded the formation of a common project of political inclusion.

The politics of indigenous reservations

On the face of it, Bolivia’s adoption of reserved seats for indigenous people is curious. Most countries use legislative reservations to guarantee the political presence of minority ethnic or cultural groups who, due to their small numbers, would not otherwise be able to compete in general elections (Lijphart 1986; Reynolds 2005; Htun 2004). In Bolivia, however, people of indigenous ancestry, far from a numerically small minority, are the majority. Many studies report that, according to the 2001 census, 62% of the population identifies as indigenous (see, for example, Van Cott 2005; Assies and Salman 2005; Madrid 2008; Lucero 2008).

Yet, in fact, the generic category “indigenous” has little salience in Bolivia. The widely used 62% census figure refers to the total number of Bolivians identifying with a specific ethnic group, such as Aymara, Quechua, Guarani, Chiquitano, or Mojeño.40 When surveys ask about generic “indigenous” or “originary” identity, the number of people responding is quite small, between some 16 and 19% of the country. More people identify as “mestizo” (Table 2).

Table 2 compares results of the census with LAPOP and UNDP sample surveys. It reveals that, though well over a majority of Bolivians identify with specific indigenous ethnic groups, well over a majority of these also opt to identify as “mestizo.”41 Indigenous and mestizo are not mutually exclusive categories. In addition, there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity and distinct levels of identification within each ethnic category, reflecting patterns of migration, geography, economic activity, and interaction with the state (Albó 2008; Zavaleta 2008). “Indigenous peoples” include rural communities with traditional cultural and social practices as well as groups that speak only Spanish, live in urban areas, and work in the formal economy. There are multiple ways of being “indigenous” and a plurality of forms of indigenous agency (Albró 2006, 420–422; see also Jung 2008).

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous or originario (generic term)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of people who identify with specific group (including Quechua, Aymara, Guarani, Chiquitano, Mojeño, or other)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mestizo or cholo</td>
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<td>White</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>None or other</td>
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*Source: adapted from Zavaleta (2008, 52). Blank cells indicate that the survey did not include this category. Note that, since the census, LAPOP, and UNDP studies ask different questions so they are not directly comparable.*
a brief trajectory to illustrate the way that the discussion over reserved ethnic seats reflected diverse interests among indigenous peoples. The geographical cleavage between the eastern, tropical lowlands and the western, Andean highland regions divides the indigenous movement and virtually every other feature of the Bolivian polity. Lowland and highland peoples have “different modes of economic and social organization and distinct histories of relations with political parties and the state” (Van Cott 2005, 52). Fewer in number than their highland counterparts, lowland groups have organized primarily in defense of their autonomy, access to land, and control of natural resources. The lowland federation CIDOB, representing dozens of groups in several departments, was never able to forge a national organization of highland and lowland movements (Yashar 2005, 198–204).

Different political projects characterized highland indigenous movements. Beginning in the 1960s, Indianista (Indianist) movements were focused primarily on racism and the defense of Indian rights while Kataristas organized along both ethnic and class lines, both as indigenous peoples and as peasants. Kataristas formed the CSUTCB (Single Peasant Union Federation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) in 1979. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, it remained Bolivia’s largest indigenous organization (Yashar 2005, 167–181; Van Cott 2005, 52–59).

The “second generation” of movements that emerged in the wake of free-market reforms of the 1980s had at least two distinct orientations. Coca growers unions — formed by miners dismissed by the closure of state-owned enterprises and other peasants — sought the legalization of coca production and consumption, a goal they defended, in part, with reference to indigenous traditions. The cocaleros formed parties and began competing in elections, eventually forming the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in 1999 (Albó 2002, 2008; Yashar 2005; Postero 2010; Van Cott 2005). Meanwhile, other indigenous groups organized to reconstitute the ayllu, the basic unit of pre-Colombian social and political organization that had been displaced by the peasant revolution of the 1950s. Their umbrella organization — CONAMAQ — became a principal defender of the classical Indianist project of political and cultural autonomy.

Though the governing party (the MAS) emerged from one sector of the indigenous movement, it grew by recruiting politicians from the traditional left to fill slots on candidate lists and by forging alliances with a broad range of social movements (Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2005). The MAS’s inclusiveness is largely responsible for its electoral success: it has been able to win votes from people that identify with particular ethnic groups and mestizo (Madrid 2012, 99–100). The party has three primary tendencies: an indigenist one responsible for deploying and managing cultural symbols, a state-interventionist, socialist sector that controls public policy, and a populist sector rooted in the radical movements that brought down the previous government (Laserna 2010, 39–42). The populist tendency — rooted in the personal fame and charisma of Evo Morales — is oriented toward the poor and deploys a fierce anti-establishment discourse (Laserna 2010, 39–42; Madrid 2012, 100–107).

In the clash between these multiple projects, the indigenist one has tended to lose out. Development of the hydrocarbon sector offers one example. The state’s commitment to explore new and untapped reserves to fund social programs pits it against indigenous groups seeking control over ancestral territories (Kaup 2010; Gustafson 2011). In addition, the MAS actively opposed the creation of self-governing indigenous units (autonomías indígenas), fearing they would exclude the party from participation in local politics. In elections held in 11 municipalities to choose authorities to steer the communities toward the new autonomy regime, the MAS fielded slates of candidates to compete against leaders that had been pre-selected by communal assemblies, against the explicit wishes of indigenous organizations (Cameron 2010, 10–12). Further disagreements over the autonomy process provoked a march by the lowland indigenous federation CIDOB and mutual accusations of foreign financing and traitorous behavior, a pattern that repeated itself in 2011 during conflicts over the government’s proposal to build a highway.
through the TIPNIS (Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro). The proposal for indigenous reserved seats must be seen in this context. Disadvantaged sectors of the indigenous movement, engaged in mounting conflicts with the government over indigenous rights, have sought reserved seats to preserve their independence. Reserved seats, however, conflict with the majority interests of the indigenous movement, which center on maximizing the power of the MAS party.

**Majority interests and interests of a disadvantaged subgroup: party power and reserved seats**

Shortly after assuming power in January of 2006, the MAS government made moves to fulfill its campaign promise to convocate a constituent assembly. Already underway during the previous government, plans for the assembly raised the question of who would be represented and how. Would indigenous people gain presence directly as peoples (pueblos), chosen through their own usos y costumbres, or would they gain access only as individual candidates postulated by political parties? Whereas the former strategy would benefit disadvantaged subgroups within the indigenous movement, the latter would help larger groups expand their hold on power.

Several indigenous movements demanded reserved seats exempt from the general partisan contest. This was not a new demand: it had been expressed in every constitution-related workshop organized by the various federations since 2001. A declaration signed by the indigenous federations CONAMAQ, CIDOB, CSTUCB, and Bartolina Sisa in 2007, for example, demanded the right of indigenous nations to appoint half of the government’s cabinet and inclusion of a representative for each indigenous nation in the legislature, elected based on usos y costumbres. Yet, almost immediately, the government distanced itself from the proposal for reserved seats, declaring its principled opposition to all guarantees of representation and rebuffing demands by unions, peasants, and the police. All constituents were to be elected from party lists.

In spite of the MAS’s rejection of ethnic reservations, many indigenous delegates were elected to the constituent assembly. Representatives from different organizations formed the Unity Pact (Pacto de Unidad) to advocate indigenous rights. Though popular participation in the assembly was thwarted by the violence and conflict surrounding it, indigenous groups succeeded in the sense that the document was packed with rights. Provisions on direct political representation for indigenous groups – which the constitution approved in principle – were contradictory, likely owing to the fact that the vast majority of constitutional provisions were approved hastily and with little discussion by constituents meeting in a temporary location in the city of Oruro, far from the city of Sucre where the assembly was supposed to be held (Laserna 2010, 31).

The MAS’s heavy-handed behavior during the constituent assembly created conflict with many of its supporters. Indigenous movements that had initially supported the party became disenchanted. When we interviewed leaders of the indigenous federations CIDOB and CONAMAQ in 2009, they expressed distrust of the MAS. CIDOB Vice President Pedro Nuni, for example, argued that the MAS was a unionist party, not an indigenous one and, therefore, did not represent his group: “We believe that the MAS has Marxist tendencies that most of us indigenous peoples of the lowlands do not understand.” When it chooses to represent indigenous interests, it prioritizes those of the Andean groups and has failed genuinely to reach out to the lowland groups. Survey results on the 2005 elections provide support for this Andean bias. Whereas speaking the highland languages Aymara or Quechua made a respondent more likely to vote for the MAS, speaking a lowland indigenous language did not (Madrid 2012, 115).

The perceived regional bias of the MAS made the achievement of reserved seats – as a guarantee of direct representation – even more important to disadvantaged subgroups of the indigenous movement. Distinguishing between “political” and “indigenous” representation, several leaders claimed that the genuine participation of originary peoples could not occur through
mainstream political parties. As one put it, “there’s no representative for the sullos, for the markas, let alone for the ayllus.” Another indigenous leader confirmed that, “we, the indigenous people, have always determined ourselves to be independent and non-political.” A leader of the highland indigenous federation CONAMAQ argued that the federation: “remains as our ancestor left us. We are not of the left or the right. We uphold the position of the originary indigenous people of the Collasuyo.”

When Congress began to debate the temporary electoral law, the lowland federation CIDOB presented a proposal for 34 seats and CONAMAQ, the highland federation, for 24. They insisted that officials be chosen through usos y costumbres instead of open competitive elections. At the same time, the National Electoral Court introduced a proposal that largely mirrored indigenous demands for direct representation, though it refrained from proposing a fixed number of seats, arguing that these could be determined later based on “scientific” criteria.

The bill proposed by the MAS-led government, by contrast, proposed to create only 15 reserved indigenous districts. This number was intended as a compromise between the indigenous demand that each nation have its own congressional seat and their actual demographic weight. Indigenous leaders claimed that the government had elaborated the bill without consulting them and maintained that 15 seats would not be enough to guarantee their representation. Attempting to modify the government’s initial decision, representatives from the major indigenous federations went on a hunger strike to highlight the importance of their cause (Mokrani and Uriona 2009).

After tough negotiations between the MAS and the opposition party, PODEMOS (the largest opposition party in Congress that opposed high numbers of reserved seats), the final law reserved merely seven seats for indigenous peoples in the 2009 elections, a significantly smaller number than the 34 demanded by CIDOB and fewer than half of the government’s original proposal for 15. Any party or group could nominate candidates for election in the indigenous districts and usos y costumbres were not protected.

Indigenous federations were disappointed with the final outcome of the electoral law, which they felt had failed to recognize indigenous peoples as subjects constituting the nation (Mokrani and Uriona 2009). The lowland federation CIDOB’s reaction was more radical: the group felt that the government had betrayed the indigenous movement, the constitution, and the constitutional process. Pedro Nuni believed they were fooled. “They let us down, they didn’t tell us the truth. We were tricked by the politicians in Congress.” CIDOB issued a resolution asking indigenous communities to mobilize publicly to reject the law, denouncing it as a renewed assault on indigenous rights.

Though the outcome of the 2009 electoral law could be partially explained as the result of opposition from PODEMOS, the same cannot be said for the permanent electoral law approved in 2010. The government – unconstrained because it had won a two-thirds congressional majority in December 2009 – had a chance to raise the number of seats from seven. Yet indigenous proposals for more seats were not even considered. In fact, Evo Morales borrowed the arguments made earlier by the opposition party PODEMOS to disqualify indigenous demands: “some congresspeople are elected with 120,000 votes and others with 500 … it is okay for minorities to have representation, but this difference amounts to discrimination against the majority.”

The MAS’s opposition to giving each indigenous group a seat in Congress conforms to its ambivalence about the project of indigenous autonomy more generally. Over the course of 2009 and 2010, the MAS grew increasingly hostile to indigenous demands that challenged the authority of the party or the state (Cameron 2010, 10). Some observers have claimed the MAS is not truly an indigenous party and fails to represent indigenous interests. Yet this view, which seems to presume that there is an “authentic” indigeneity, flies in the face of most contemporary social theory. Cultures, social groups, and the normative traditions they uphold do not possess an essential core but are continually engaged in contestation and resignification (see,
for example, Benhabib 2002, 82–104). People of indigenous descent who defend a classical project of autonomy and those who militate in the MAS are staking out diverse ways of being indigenous. The intersectional approach adopted in this paper incorporates these contradictions: it admits that different sectors of a (formerly) marginalized group may have different views on the group’s interests and purpose. We should be less concerned about who represents the “authentic” core of the group than whether deliberative processes that express interests and collective identities are fair and inclusive (Benhabib 1992, 2002; Habermas 1996). What is most worrisome about the MAS is not its divergence from indigenous authenticity but its willingness to resort to intimidation against its opponents.$^67$

The MAS’s unwillingness to cede to indigenous demands for autonomy must be seen in light of the challenge to its rule posed by elites in the eastern provinces. Regional oligarchies fed by soy, sugar, and cotton exports as well as hydrocarbon extraction defend free market policies, privatization, and the rights of multinationals against the MAS’s redistributive and nationalist project (Eaton 2007; Gustafson 2008a; Kohl 2010). Alienated by the party’s promotion of indigenous cultural identity and fearing its plans for land reform, these elites sought an exit from central government domination and compelled Morales to hold a national referendum on autonomy in 2006. It won in the eastern provinces but lost in the western ones. In 2008, the four eastern provinces held their own autonomy referenda to secure regional control over natural resources and tax revenues.$^68$ Eastern elites have resorted to violence and even the massacre of popular protestors; there is also evidence that quasi-paramilitary rural defense committees have formed to fight migrants and squatter encroachment. Like indigenous movements defending the ayllu and usos y costumbres, the eastern oligarchy deploys a discourse of autonomy. But the extent of autonomy they demand far exceeds anything else in the recent wave of decentralization in Latin America and would significantly constrain the redistributive capacity of Bolivia’s central government (Eaton 2007, 74; 2011; Gustafson 2008a).

Conclusion

These stories about Bolivia show that not all good things go together. Though women mobilized across class and ethnic lines and succeeded in gaining parity in participation, indigenous movements continued to have their demands for inclusion rejected by a government that had otherwise pledged itself to their cause. To explain these diverse outcomes, we demonstrated that the Bolivian movement for gender parity and the movement for indigenous reservations differed in significant ways. Whereas women strategically put aside their differences over other issues to unite behind gender parity, different sectors of the indigenous movement entertained different proposals for inclusion and reserved seats. What is more, the parity issue affected women across the board while reservations were targeted at numerically small, rural groups. This disadvantaged sector of the indigenous movement sought to protect its independence from a governing party that was evolving to embrace a wider set of actors and issues. Over time, the MAS grew increasingly hostile toward the project of indigenous autonomy for its perceived challenge to the party’s control of political life.

Bolivia’s experiences do not reflect universal features of gender or indigeneity but the particular ways these social groups and their demands evolved in that country. What may be generalized is the theoretical lens this paper brought to bear on the puzzle of political inclusion. Our intersectional approach reveals that marginalized groups are not a single category but a collection of categories. The unity of the group is a political achievement, not a premise of politics. Explaining group success in achieving policy goals requires a prior analysis of a group’s ability to construct a common political strategy amidst diversity (Lee 2008).
We argued that parties prefer candidate quotas and parity to reserved seats. By requiring parties simply to add individual women to party lists, quotas pose less of a threat to party interests than reserved seats, which hold the potential to reduce the party’s share of seats and alter the partisan balance of power. The aftermath of quotas confirms our expectations about relative threat: almost nowhere has the growing presence of women on party lists led to a revolution or significant changes within parties. In Argentina — the country that pioneered a candidate quota law in 1991 — women’s presence in congress has not challenged the control of male party leaders over the legislative agenda, committee assignments, or the incentives of legislators to avoid specializing in public good policy issues (though it has led to the introduction of more bills and greater awareness of gender issues) (Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi 2011; Piscopo and Thomas 2012). Even though women have come to occupy 30–40% of legislative seats, they are included as members of different parties, not as their own party. Coalitions forged by women to achieve quotas are often weakened inside of a legislature once they become subject to agenda control and discipline imposed by party leaders.

The rise of the MAS and its rejection of more than a token number of indigenous reservations confirms a central tenet of intersectional analysis: individuals and groups can be simultaneously privileged and marginalized (see, for example, Crenshaw 1991; Weldon 2008, 2011; Garcia Bedolla 2007). To win control of the national government, the party — which originated in an indigenous movement — expanded its appeal to more groups and a broader range of issues (Madrid 2012). As some indigenous peoples won majority power, more disadvantaged sectors were marginalized. This does not render the MAS any less “indigenous” than civic federations, such as CIDOB and CONAMAQ, but demonstrates the multiplicities and complexities within the indigenous project (cf. Albró 2006, 420, 422). Indigenous interests and identities are no longer shaped primarily by virtue of their subaltern status. The empowerment of some indigenous Bolivians has rendered visible the hierarchies of power within marginalized groups everywhere.

Acknowledgements
We are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from Kent Eaton, Christina Ewig, Bret Gustafson, Raúl Madrid, Laurel Weldon, Kurt Weyland, two anonymous reviewers, and participants in panels and seminars at the American Political Science Association, University of Texas-Austin, University of Toronto, and University of Wisconsin.

Notes
1. A small but growing number of works do compare the claims and performance of different excluded groups; see, for example, Skrentny (2002, 2006), Krook and O’Brien (2010), Htun (2004), Hughes (2011) and Moser and Holmsten (n.d.).
2. Our study is based on fieldwork conducted in Bolivia — primarily in La Paz and El Alto — in the summer of 2005 and again in the summer of 2009. We interviewed present and former legislators, present and former government officials, feminist activists, indigenous activists, union leaders, scholars, officials from international development agencies, and a German priest. In addition, we consulted government documents, the media record, and the secondary literature.
4. As we discuss in greater detail below, 62% of Bolivia’s population identifies with one of the country’s indigenous groups (36 are recognized in the Constitution). Far fewer identify with the generic category of “indigenous.”
5. Our analysis glosses over the prior political work necessary to make the category of “women” or “indigenous” salient in the first place. As Jung (2008) shows, the formation of a political identity is an achievement. Indigenous political identity gained traction in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to the consolidation of a global human rights regime and the declining political leverage of class identities amidst neo-liberal economic policies.
6. This is not the case in all systems, such as Colombia before the SNTV system was reformed in 2003 and in Brazil before the “candidato nato” (birthright candidate) rule was abrogated in 1998.

7. If the reserved seats are filled through nomination by parties or by a particular category of party candidates receiving the most votes in general elections (e.g. women in Afghanistan), they will not be as threatening to a dominant party’s position.

8. Htun (2004) argues that this variation derives from the fact that gender tends to cross-cut partisan divisions whereas mobilized ethnicity frequently coincides with them. Other scholars have argued that the variation in inclusion policies owes to transnational and regionally-specific “repertoires” of group representation (Krook and O’Brien 2010). Once a policy has been accepted as legitimate, for example, it is likely that it will be sought by and extended to another group seeking rights (Krook and O’Brien 2010; see also Skrentny 2002).

9. In deeper systems, political parties attempt to balance their tickets by nominating more women as candidates and more candidates tend to get elected from each party. Broader party systems, by contrast, incorporate a greater diversity of small parties, including those formed by ethnic minorities, but tend to elect fewer candidates — and, therefore, fewer women — per party.

10. Though a combination of national gender quotas and provisions for minority representation (which she calls “tandem quotas”) helped more ethnic minority women gain access to power, they created a disadvantage for women and men from majority ethnic groups (Hughes 2011). Tandem quotas compel party elites to add minority women to the legislature since by doing so they comply with both types of quotas simultaneously (Hughes 2011).

11. The notion of “fit” comes from Skocpol (1992, 54).


13. Author interview with Diana Urioste, La Paz, May 12, 2005.

14. Baldez and Brañez (2005, 150, fn. 16) report that Sánchez de Lozada’s daughter helped change the president’s mind about quotas. She told a local newspaper that, though her father had never limited her aspirations at home, she regretted that in four years in power he had never appointed a single woman to his cabinet. The day after the interview was published, his party (MNR) announced that 40% of candidates in the 1997 elections would be women.

15. In between the two elections, the Foro Político de Mujeres lobbied parties and the Supreme Electoral Court to apply the quota law in a way more favorable to women. Instead of counting from the top of the titular list to the bottom, and putting women in every third titular slot (from which they stand little chance of gaining a seat), the Foro proposed that the lists be counted horizontally, from first titular position to first suplente position and so on, so that the third (women’s) position would correspond to the second titular position on this list (Baldez and Brañez 2005). The court denied the petition but the public opinion campaign succeeded in compelling parties to improve women’s list placement.


18. We are reporting these statements, even if we do not necessarily agree with them, since they reveal the lack of co-operation and mutual understanding among women.


20. Interview with Rosario Paz, La Paz, May 12, 2005.

21. Interview with Esther Balboa, La Paz, May 12, 2005. Balboa, who did graduate work in Canada and Mexico, was selected by Felipe Quispe to be his vice-presidential candidate in the 2002 elections for the MIP party. The objective was to achieve both male/female and Aymara/Quechua parity.

22. Interview, La Paz, May 16, 2005.


24. In an interview with the Nation, he observed:

Very early on we discussed gender inequality at the highest levels of government. We agreed that you can either opt for an understanding from a minority perspective or a majority one. It turns out that gender inequity is quite similar to the discrimination faced by indigenous people. During previous governments, a special ministry was established for indigenous groups. But why should the majority of the population be relegated to just one ministry? The same is true of women. Why should they be treated like a minority when they are, in fact, the majority? We believe women should be present in every level of government according to ability. Our first minister of government was a woman, and this is a position that is always perceived as requiring a strong and authoritative man. So we feel that by having women stuck off in a ministry or vice-ministry, we are marginalizing them. Just like indigenous people, women should participate fully.
Ironically, the same “gender” perspective informed creation of the Subsecretariat under the government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Paulson and Callá 2000).

26. Ibid.
27. Interview with MAS Deputy Ximena Florez, La Paz, June 17, 2009.
29. The government bowed to pressure from women’s movements and agreed to alternate men and women’s names on party lists for election to the assembly. (Alternation had also been included in plans of the previous government.) As a result, women made up one-third of delegates to the constituent assembly overall and almost half of those from the MAS. Approximately half – and likely more – of the female delegates were indigenous (Rousseau 2011, 12–14).
30. The decision to avoid issues provoking conflict resembles patterns in other countries. Women in Mexico’s congress, for example, explicitly decided to leave abortion off the agenda in order to preserve their multi-party political alliance. Author interview with Patricia Mercado, Mexico City, July, 2000.
31. For more information on the constituent assembly conflicts, see Laserna (2010).
32. Interview with Deputy Elizabeth Salguero, La Paz, June 14, 2009.
34. Interview with Ximena Florez, La Paz, June 17, 2009.
40. Thirty-six different groups are recognized in the 2009 Constitution.
41. According to a public opinion survey conducted in 2006, 76% of people identifying as Quechua also identified as mestizo. The same was true of 56% of Aymaras and 79% of Chiquitanos (Toranzo 2008, 39).
43. For more information on the politics of regionalism in Bolivia, see Eaton (2007), Roca (2008) and Barragán (2008).
45. In various local referenda held in late 2009, many indigenous voters also opposed the creation of indigenous autonomousities.
47. See, for example, “Propuesta sobre Reforma a la Constitución Política del Estado,” Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB), Santa Cruz, December 2001; “Propuesta para la Asamblea
50. For discussion of the political conflicts, violence, and maneuvering during the constituent assembly process, see Laserna (2010).

51. Rights protected include, among others, the right to cultural identity, religious belief, traditions, and customs; self-determination and territory; collective land titling; the protection of sacred places; collective intellectual property over knowledge and science; the practice of political, legal and economic systems that conform to indigenous cosmovision; prior consultation with regard to the exploration of subsoil resources in Indian lands; autonomous management of indigenous territory and exclusive use of renewable resources (without prejudice to “rights legitimately acquired by third parties); and participation in state institutions (República de Bolivia 2009, Article 30). Article 32 guarantees the “Afro-Bolivian people” all the rights granted to the “indigenous originary peasant peoples.”

52. For example, article 146 states that the districts for indigenous, originary, peasant groups should be proportional to population density, established in rural areas in those departments where indigenous are a minority, and should not cross departmental boundaries. Article 147 states the opposite: it instructs legislators to establish the seats without regard to population density or departmental boundaries (República de Bolivia 2009).

53. Interview with Pedro Nuni, Vice-President CIDOB, June 16, 2009.

54. Ibid.

55. Interviews with Tata Elias Quelca, director of CONAMAQ, June 11, 2009; Nilda Copa, executive of the Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Originarias de Bolivia, Bartolina Sisa, June 13, 2009; Pedro Nuni, Vice-President of CIDOB, June 16, 2009, respectively.

56. Interview with Tata Elias Quelca, June 11, 2009.


58. The Electoral Court believed that it could determine the number of indigenous seats and their geographical distribution in a scientific manner based on population data, information about communal land holdings, and records of indigenous political participation. Interview with José Luis Exeni, former President of the Corte Nacional Electoral, June 14, 2009.

59. The 15 seats proposed by the government included 13 seats for indigenous minority groups and an additional seat each for Quechua and Aymara. If the 36 constitutionally recognized indigenous groups divided themselves between titulares and suplentes (alternates), the proposal could offer representation to a total of 30 groups, so argued the government. Interview with Oscar Cámara, Ministro de Control Social de Empresas, June 6, 2009. In addition, only the main indigenous federations CIDOB, CONAMAQ, and the CSTUCB were entitled to nominate candidates for the seats, giving them a monopoly on indigenous representation in the special districts and preventing opposition parties from competing. What is more, the number of reserved seats in each province was to be subtracted from their number of PR seats, not the SMDs (uninominales).


61. Interview with Sergio Medinacelli, PODEMOS adviser and former delegate to the constituent assembly, La Paz, June 8, 2009.


63. “Indigenas acusan al Mas de traición y acuden a la ONU,” La Razón, April 9, 2009.
64. Coordinadora de Pueblos Etnicos de Santa Cruz, Resolution signed on April 8, 2009.


66. Since its rise, many Bolivians have denied that the party possesses a legitimate indigenous project. Felipe Quispe, former presidential candidate and leader of the MIP, has declared that “Evo is not an Indian. He’s a socialist,” and that the MAS is “not the expression of the indigenous nation. They are from the middle class and the sour destitute Left” (quoted in Albó 2006, 416). The vice-president of the lowland federation CIDOB opined that “the MAS is a leftist political party … that did not emerge from the real indigenous movement” (Interview, La Paz, June 16, 2009). Other analysts suggest that the MAS’s ethnic project is more opportunistic: “[Quispe’s] MIP is the real ethnic party. In MAS it’s a secondary issue. Evo doesn’t use ethnic card that much but he knows that the ethnic theme sells very well abroad” (Salvador Romero, Author interview, May 17, 2005).

67. It could also be argued that Bolivia is a poor example of the way that inherent party interests drive preferences for policies to include marginalized groups. As Kurt Weyland asked us: is the MAS “enough of a party” to possess and pursue interests concerning political inclusion? Though structured like a party (at least on paper), the MAS’s statutes are not implemented in practice, the party lacks administrative structure in the most important regions of the country, and candidate selection depends largely on the approval of Evo Morales, though in some cases candidates are elected by social movements and popular assemblies (Anria 2009, 76–78). What is more, the MAS rose to power on an anti-party platform, calling for an end to party-dominated representation and referring to itself as a “political instrument” of grassroots movements and unions, not a party (Madrid 2008, 2012; Anria 2009; Do Alto and Stefanoni 2010). The weakly institutionalized nature of the MAS enhances the role of Evo Morales as ultimate decision maker and arbiter of conflict, rendering the MAS as unpredictable as the man who leads it. Yet we still believe that the MAS meets the minimalist criteria of a party as a team seeking to win elections: it has selected candidates to run for office (albeit through procedures that are not predictable or transparent), contested elections by following the rules (though it has tried to rig these in its favor, such as during the constitutional convention of 2007–08), and formulated policy while adhering to legislative procedures.

68. Unsanctioned by the National Electoral Court, the election was widely seen as illegal.

69. In fact, many male party leaders endorsed quotas for women in an effort to shore up their own position (e.g. Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Perú) (see also Baldez 2004; Dahlerup 2008).

References


