Between Science and Engineering: Reflections on the APSA Presidential Task Force on Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance

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Political scientists have contributed to the world of electoral systems as scientists and as engineers. Taking stock of recent scientific research, we show that context modifies the effects of electoral rules on political outcomes in specific and systematic ways. We explore how electoral rules shape the inclusion of women and minorities, the depth and nature of political competition, and patterns of redistribution and regulation, and we consider institutional innovations that could promote political equality. Finally, we describe the diverse ways that political scientists produce an impact on the world by sharing and applying their knowledge of the consequences of electoral rules and global trends in reform.

Introduction
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Mala Htun and G. Bingham Powell

This symposium offers a general overview of the results of the APSA Presidential Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance, organized by then President-Elect Bing Powell in 2011 and chaired by Mala Htun. Since the purpose of APSA task forces is to “expand the public presence of the discipline of political science,” it seemed to us that the field of electoral rules was a natural focus. It has a variety of important political consequences: electoral rules are one of the crucial forces in making democracy work, and small variations in them can go a long way toward shaping the type of democracy that develops.

Electoral systems constitute one of the oldest and most prolifically studied subjects of our discipline. Hundreds of political scientists dedicate themselves to developing and testing theories about the consequences of electoral rules...
and regulations for representation, governance, and other aspects of democratic politics. They are currently pushing new frontiers.

Political scientists are engaged in educating and advising policymakers around the world. Sharing and applying knowledge about the consequences of electoral rules is one of the principal ways we make our work relevant. By traveling to different countries, writing policy reports, lecturing at regional and international meetings, and serving as expert witnesses in court, political scientists have educated and expanded the options available to policy makers, political parties, civic groups, and other stakeholders.

Political scientists thus relate to the world of election systems in two ways: as scientists and as engineers. The work of the task force analyzed both of these dimensions, taking stock of the scientific and the engineering contributions of political scientists—mostly U.S.-based ones—to the world of electoral systems. We were fortunate to be able to involve eleven outstanding scholars, some of whom have themselves served actively as consultants, who shared our enthusiasm for the field and were willing to help us analyze its scientific and engineering dimensions: John Carey, Karen Ferree, Simon Hix, Mona Lena Krook, Robert Moser, Shaheen Mozaffar, Andrew Rehfeld, Andrew Reynolds, Ethan Scheiner, Melissa Schwartzberg, and Matthew S. Shugart.

Instead of reviewing the extensive scientific works on how election rules shape disproportionality between votes and seats, the number of parties, governability, and other issues, the symposium focuses on more recent research investigating the ways that context systematically mediates the effects of election rules on political outcomes. Karen Ferree, Bing Powell, and Ethan Scheiner present a general framework to show how contextual features intervene in the causal chains connecting the features of electoral rules with outcomes such as legislative representation or governability. Following this framework, Mona Krook and Robert Moser show how contextual factors influence the incentives electoral rules offer to parties to promote women and minorities as candidates for popular election.

Matthew Shugart’s essay on how more “open” and “closed” ballot structures shape party competition and individual accountability emphasizes that context can alter these effects. Finally, John Carey and Simon Hix’s analysis of the close connection between electoral rules and patterns of socioeconomic redistribution and regulation acknowledges the importance of context: although these relationships hold consistently in the institutionalized party systems characteristic of older democracies, they are less robust in newer ones.

To explore the role of political scientists as engineers, contributors to the symposium adopted a multi-method approach consisting of surveys, case studies, and personal interviews. Results of this research are described in the essay by Carey, Hix, Mala Htun, Shaheen Mozaffar, Powell, and Andrew Reynolds. Our findings reveal the range of political science engineering, from authoring policy reports and briefs, making presentations to global and regional audiences, traveling on country missions to educate and advise policy makers and other stakeholders, offering on-the-spot policy advice, and serving as expert witnesses in redistricting and voting rights litigation.

The scientific and engineering dimensions of the relationship between political scientists and electoral systems are mutually reinforcing. By the 1980s and 1990s, the evolution of the scientific field had yielded solid theoretical generalizations concerning the consequences of single-member district plurality systems versus multi-member, low-threshold proportional representation systems, among other variations. Around the same time, dozens of new democracies had emerged during the “third wave.” As engineers, political scientists were involved in these transitions as policy makers sought their help designing new constitutions, as the essay by Carey, Hix, Htun, Mozaffar, Powell, and Reynolds describes. The consequences of electoral rules in new democracies did not always match theoretical predictions, however.

To explain the anomalies, political scientists as scientists went back to the drawing board, developing fresh theories about how contextual factors intervene to shape electoral rule effects. As the essay by Ferree, Powell, and Scheiner shows, these works incorporate the particularities of local contexts into the internal causal logics of general theories, revealing how context affects the mechanical conversion of votes into seats and how context affects the way electoral rules provide incentives for the behavior of elites and voters. Predictions about how and in what ways context matters gave engineering political scientists additional tools at their disposal when advising democracy promotion organizations and policy makers in new democracies. Effective choice of election rules and regulations depends on both the salience of particular goals and on the interaction of rules and local context.

Political scientists have responded to the challenges of the real world in other ways as well. The mobilization of women and minorities around demands for political inclusion prompted episodes of electoral reform in many established democracies and altered the processes of constitution-making in new ones. Political scientists studying these experiences developed a large body of theory about the consequences of different electoral rules and regulations for the political presence of women and minorities, as the essay by Krook and Moser points out. Engineering political scientists shared this knowledge about global trends and experiences via written reports (commissioned by democracy promotion and other international organizations), presentations at global and regional conferences of stakeholders, and smaller meetings with government officials and civil society groups. Their work spreading information about gender quotas has been an important factor contributing to the global diffusion of these policies.
At the same time, growing evidence about the ways elections are actually practiced in many new democracies (and some older ones)—often involving voter fraud, intimidation, and other irregularities—helped motivate the development of the scientific field of electoral integrity, while mobilizing many political scientists to help to improve these processes as engineers. As Ferree, Powell, and Scheiner point out in their essay, electoral rules may not have their intended effects in the context of coercion, including illegal acts on election day (such as ballot stuffing, tabulation fraud, voter intimidation, and the like) as well as less visible acts earlier in the electoral cycle such as the introduction of restrictive voter registration laws and partisan gerrymandering of districts. In addition, variations in electoral integrity may shape the relationship between the electoral system and its operational goals.

Even when rules are followed perfectly, no electoral system can achieve all desirable goals simultaneously, as Andrew Rehfeld and Melissa Schwartzberg’s essay notes. A concept as foundational as political equality can be interpreted in distinctive ways: as the equal chance to vote for a winning candidate (thus implying proportionality and inclusion), the equal chance to influence a policymaker (implying single-party government), or the responsiveness of elected representatives to voters’ policy preferences (implying ideological congruence). Yet some of these ends are incompatible with others. The choice of an electoral system has normative consequences, requiring a clarification of priorities, acceptance of tradeoffs, and perhaps even the sacrifice of a competing value.

Electoral rules go a long way toward shaping the way democracy develops. They determine whether relevant perspectives are included in decision making, the nature of the government that emerges, the ways in which the public can hold this government accountable, and the pressures on parties to pursue certain modes of socioeconomic redistribution (or not). For democracy to spread and become sustainable, actors on the ground need to know about these relationships and how they are mediated by contextual factors. By developing, testing, and sharing theories about how different electoral designs shape politics, political scientists play an important role in this process.

How Context Shapes the Effects of Electoral Rules

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Karen E. Ferree, G. Bingham Powell and Ethan Scheiner

Electoral systems represent one of the primary levers through which constitutional engineers can shape emergent democratic polities. Yet most of what we know about the effects of electoral rules emerges from the experience of well-established democracies. Should we expect similar outcomes when we place these same rules in contexts that are new to free and fair elections?

Political scientists have long contemplated the consequences of election rules. Going back to the nineteenth century, scholars noted the importance of giving numerical minorities a voice in government, and many advocated for proportional representation (PR), a set of rules in which there is more than one seat per district and seats are allocated to parties in proportion to their share of the vote. In 1861, John Stuart Mill argued that single-member or winner-take-all electoral rules tend to advantage the largest parties.

The modern study of the consequences of election rules dates from Maurice Duverger’s Political Parties, which articulated the “sociological law” that single member district plurality rules tend toward two-party systems and also observed that proportional representation rules promote multiparty systems. Douglas Rae’s Political Consequences of Electoral Laws converted Duverger’s observations into quantitative hypotheses and tested them with cross-national data. Over the next thirty years, numerous empirical studies—led by the 1994 work of Arend Lijphart and his colleagues—explored these relationships. By 2005, Matthew Shugart could write of a “mature field” of electoral systems and party systems, with “core concerns” of “macro” (aggregate) outcomes such as the number of parties and proportionality. Independently, the field also developed insights into the “micro” dimension—the calculations and actions of voters, candidates, party leaders, campaign contributors, and so on—which Gary Cox integrated with past work on macro outcomes.

The field explored a variety of features of electoral systems, but its most widely accepted generalizations distinguished between the effects of single member district (or high threshold, low district magnitude PR) rules and multi-member, low threshold, high district magnitude PR. The former type of electoral system was associated with “two-party” systems, greater disproportionality, and frequent single-party majority governments. The latter type was associated with more parties, less disproportionality, and the absence of single-party governments. These outcomes were in turn associated with secondary outcomes of government stability, effectiveness, accountability, and representation.

Nevertheless, some looked upon the generalizations of the electoral system literature with skepticism, in part because of notable “exceptions.” Much recent research has sought to replace the exceptions with theoretically-founded and systematically-specified explanations of when variation from the generalization should be expected. This new research is significant, since it is critical to constitution makers in the “real” world, and because it often relates to new democracies whose contexts make “exceptions” appear more likely. In many new democracies, there is significant social division, incomplete rule of law, electoral fraud,
behavioral" causal linkages. Mechanical linkages flow immediately from an electoral rule or it may be dis-
proportionality. Put another way, conditional on a par-
ticular election, parties tend to win roughly the same share of votes and seats and disproportionality is low. In contrast, where there are many seats in a district and there is no minimum number of votes needed for a party to gain seats, parties tend to win roughly the same share of votes and seats and disproportionality is low.

Disproportionality is therefore an example of an outcome that is connected to an electoral rule through a short causal chain and largely mechanical linkage. Because the link is mechanical, we expect contextual factors to have a limited mediating impact on how electoral rules shape disproportionality. Put another way, conditional on a particular distribution of votes and barring coercive efforts to manipulate outcomes in a blatant and illegal fashion, electoral rules should have the same effect on disproportionality everywhere.16

The Number of Parties in Elections to the National Legislature

In contrast, contextual factors ought to impinge heavily on how electoral rules shape national party systems. There

How Does Context Shape the Effects of Electoral Rules?

We define context, broadly and inclusively, as anything external to the institutional rule itself. We expect two fea-
tures of the causal chain linking electoral institutions to outcomes to shape how contextual factors mediate the effects of electoral rules. First, we expect the length of the causal chain to be significant.12 A particular outcome may flow immediately from an electoral rule or it may be dis-
tantly related. In the former (proximate) category are out-
comes such as disproportionality and malapportionment. In the latter (distal) category are outcomes such as the size of the national party system, the stability of parliamentary governments, the accountability of governments to elec-
torates, and the ideological representation of the elector-
ate in government. Electoral rules do, to some extent, affect distal outcomes, but because there are so many links in the chain, there are more opportunities for context to affect outcomes in these cases.

Second, we expect the type of causal linkages to be important. Following a tradition dating back to Maurice Duverger, we distinguish between "mechanical" and "behavioral" causal linkages.13 Mechanical linkages flow directly from rules, independent of human decision-making; given a set of inputs, the rules produce outputs by means of a mathematical algorithm. In contrast, behavioral mechanisms are a function of discretionary human action. People interpret the rule and respond to it, filtering the rule through their perceptions, beliefs, and cost-benefit calculus (including anticipation of mechanical effects). Because people respond in ways shaped by context, we speculate that context will more systematically shape the outcomes of electoral rules when the link between the institution and the outcome involves human discretion.

In sum, the shorter the chain, and the more mechanical the linkages, the less context should matter. The exception is that coercive contextual factors may interfere with both behavioral and mechanical linkages. Coer-
ceptive factors shape the extent to which the formal institutions are "the real rules of the game." Examples include the use of violence and intimidation to subvert outcomes, fraud, and more broadly, items from Andreas Schedler's "Menu of Manipulation."14

We illustrate these general expectations through a dis-
cussion of specific outcomes, starting with district-level disproportionality and party systems, and then moving on to more distant outcomes—the number of parties in the national legislature and the extent to which the gov-
ernment represents the views of the public.

Forming the National Legislature

A rich literature discusses how electoral institutions shape party systems.15 Because of the significantly greater num-
ber of behavioral steps in the chain linking electoral rules to the national party system, contextual factors ought to shape that outcome to a much greater degree than they will the level of disproportionality.

Disproportionality Disproportionality is the degree to which the share of seats allocated to parties matches the share of votes that they win. In first-past-the-post (FPTP) sys-
tems, whenever there is more than one contestant winning a significant number of votes, disproportionality at the dis-
trict level is high. In contrast, where there are many seats in a district and there is no minimum number of votes needed for a party to gain seats, parties tend to win roughly the same share of votes and seats and disproportionality is low.

In contrast, contextual factors ought to impinge heavily on how electoral rules shape national party systems. There
There are two stages in the chain linking electoral rules to national party systems: from the electoral rule to the number of parties competing at the district level, and from the number of parties at the district level to the number of parties competing for seats in the national legislature (refer to Figure 1).17

Number of Parties at the District Level The impact of electoral rules on the number of parties at the district level has been the focus of many waves of research in political science. As originally argued by Duverger,18 there are both mechanical and behavioral mechanisms linking electoral rules to the district-level number of parties.

On the mechanical side, “restrictive” rules—most notably, FPTP, which awards a single-member district seat to the top vote-winning candidate in a district—lead to outcomes with high disproportionality, favoring large parties or parties with geographically concentrated support. In contrast, “permissive” rules—especially proportional representation with large numbers of seats per district—allow even small parties to win seats, and thereby minimize disproportionality.

On the behavioral side, anticipation of the mechanical effect shapes the behavior of voters and elites. Restrictive rules induce supporters to strategically concentrate campaign contributions and votes on truly competitive candidates. Candidates anticipate these actions, and often choose not to run if they have no chance of victory. Put together, this behavior reduces the number of candidates or parties winning votes in restrictive systems. In contrast, in permissive electoral systems, even parties that win relatively small numbers of votes can win seats. Supporters in such systems therefore worry less about wasting their support, and can engage in more “sincere” behavior, backing their top choice in the election. The expectation of Duverger’s Law is therefore that FPTP rules lead to only two viable candidates per district, whereas systems with permissive electoral rules tend to contain more than two viable parties contesting elections. Cox19 synthesizes the logic underpinning these outcomes and identifies the common pattern across them: the M+1 rule, whereby the number of parties or candidates in a district is capped at the district magnitude (M) plus one.

The Effects of Context Contextual factors can interact with electoral rules to shape the number of parties at the district level in two ways. First, contextual factors can winnow down the number of parties/candidates contesting seats below the M+1 ceiling. The M+1 rule places an upper bound on the number of parties that a system can support, but, for highly permissive systems, this is not particularly informative. For example, South Africa uses a national list proportional representation system, where half of the 400 parliamentary seats...
ties have no chance of beating Museveni, even if they
opposition parties challenge Museveni, most notably the
Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), headed by Kizza
besides the African National Congress (ANC), taking almost two thirds of the vote. To explain these outcomes, we need to look to context: the significance of race in shaping voting behavior after 40 years of apartheid and several centuries of segregation; the success of the ANC in becoming a focal point for anti-apartheid forces; the strategic use of resources by the ANC to prevent its opponents from making inroads into its constituency; and the ANC’s success at cauterizing splinters within its coalition.

Second, context may mediate the operation of the mechanical and behavioral mechanisms by interfering with the strategic behavior of voters, candidates, and elites that underlies the M+1 rule, thus producing a larger effective number of viable candidates than predicted by the institutions. As Cox highlights, a number of conditions shape the strategic coordination underlying the M+1 rule.23 One such condition involves the nature and strength of voter preferences for parties. Where many voters see little difference between the competitive options, they are less likely strategically to shift their votes away from their uncompetitive first choice party—thus preventing the reduction in the number of parties necessary for the M+1 rule. In fact, a number of contexts may promote this situation. For example, salient social divisions (racial, ethnic, or religious) may breed intense partisan attachments, particularly if voters see the party as an extension of their group.24 Perhaps for this reason, socially diverse countries produce larger party systems, even under FPTP rules.25

Widespread strategic behavior consistent with the M+1 rule will also be unlikely where information is lacking about which candidates are in or out of the running. In political systems with limited democratic experience, there may be significant uncertainty about likely political outcomes. In fact, plurality races in new democracies, especially those with poorly-institutionalized party systems, often involve relatively little strategic defection from weak candidates and, in turn, a large number of parties.26 Expectations of coercion can also inhibit strategic defection. Uganda has FPTP rules, for example, yet the number of parties at the district level frequently exceeds two. Recent Ugandan elections have been dominated by Yoweri Museveni and his party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Museveni employs a number of techniques to stay in power including blatant fraud, coercion of candidates, threats of violence, and vote buying. A number of opposition parties challenge Museveni, most notably the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), headed by Kizza Besigye. However, voters generally believe that these parties have no chance of beating Museveni, even if they form a common front. In this context, it is not surprising that opposition voters see little incentive to defect from their first choice to vote for a party that has a slightly higher probability (but realistically no chance) of defeating the NRM. When a party can create an image of invincibility through ideological positioning, fraud, clientelism, intimidation, or any combination thereof, it may discourage strategic coordination amongst opposition voters and candidates, even under FPTP rules.

Context can also come in the form of other political institutions. Most notably, presidentialism appears to shape the district number of legislative parties. Voters and elites have incentives to behave sincerely under permissive electoral rules, but presidential elections may push such voters and elites to behave strategically, leading to a concentration of support for candidates from parties with front-runners in the presidential race.25

Projection to the National Level The district-level (Duvergerian) behavioral effect is but one step in the chain linking electoral rules to the number of parties at the national level (refer to Figure 1). In an additional step, voters and elites in each district decide—usually through the coordination of a nationally-centralized organization—whether to join with voters and elites in other districts in support of a slate of candidates. When this coordination is successful, the district-level party systems become nationalized and the district-level number of parties becomes “projected” to the national level. The number of parties represented in the national legislature is therefore a result of the extent to which the different district-level parties aggregate across the country. In decentralized federal systems with FPTP, such as Canada and India, there may be roughly two candidates per district, but failure of projection leads to more than two national parties. In recent Canadian elections, for example, the (effective) number of candidates per district has been roughly 2.8, but the nationally-aggregated effective number of parties has been closer to 3.8.

Projection from districts to the nation depends on human discretion—that is, whether political actors in different districts coordinate with one another—thus, adding another point at which any of a number of contextual factors can shape the outcome. Rules that promote coordination across districts by tying presidential and legislative elections together or by increasing the significance of gaining control of either the presidency or the government more generally often lead to greater matching of district-level and national outcomes. In this way, projection tends to be greater in systems in which there is a plurality-elected president, concurrent legislative and presidential election, or governmental power is centralized in the national government.26

Representation of Ideological Interests Political scientists have given particular attention to the effect of rules on the number of parties, but constitutional
engineers may be more concerned with other issues, such as how different rules shape representation. A core dimension of representation is the extent to which the ideological position of the median voter is represented in government. The more congruent these positions, the more ideologically representative the system. As Figure 1 makes clear, the relationship between rules and ideological representation is long and involves many behavioral links, thus providing many opportunities for context to shape outcomes.

Continuing along the causal chain in Figure 1, we can see that congruence is shaped by the nature of government formation, which is in turn shaped by the number of parties in the legislature, as well as other factors, including whether the system is presidential or parliamentary, the degree of party discipline among legislators, and the ideological configuration of the party system.27 The causal mechanisms linking government formation to representation differ depending on whether two large parties compete for power and a single-party majority government forms or many parties compete for power and a minority or coalition government forms.28 When two large parties compete and win most parliamentary seats, the link runs through Downs’ median voter theorem, which predicts that the legislative majority party should be close to the median voter. In contrast, when many parties divide up parliament, the link runs through the inclusion of the median or plurality party in the governing coalition.30 Regardless of the causal route, both mechanisms are behavioral. The median voter theorem assumes that parties and voters behave in specific ways. When behavior departs from assumptions, parties’ full convergence to the policies of the median voter is not guaranteed. Indeed, substantial research suggests that full convergence often fails, underlining the contingency of the outcome. Moreover, while the median or plurality party is often included in governing coalitions, this inclusion is contingent on the decisions of elites. In principle, elites could opt for coalitions that poorly represent the median voter.

Although the mechanisms are behavioral for both routes to representation, for several decades following World War II in developed democracies, legislatures and governments in PR systems more consistently matched the issue positions of the median voter (i.e., created close ideological congruence) than those in SMD systems.31 Apparently because of breakdowns in Duverger-Downsian convergence in the SMD systems. However, studies of the more recent time period (roughly 1997–2004) indicate that the greater congruence under PR election rules has disappeared.32 A contextual factor—specifically, the changing context of party-system polarization—seems to be responsible for this change.

Higher levels of party-system polarization in the SMD systems, found in the immediate post-World War II decade and again in the 1970s and 1980s, limited Downsian convergence. For example, during the Thatcher years in the UK, both major parties were far apart, especially in the 1983 election. Such polarization under SMD electoral rules virtually guaranteed that majority governments would be far from the median voter. Although polarization also limited the formation of coalitions close to the median voter in the PR systems, the effects were larger and more direct in single-party majority SMD governments.33

With declining polarization in the SMD systems during the 1997–2004 period (produced, for example, by the strategic convergence of the New Labour Party in the UK), ideological congruence in SMD and PR systems still followed different causal paths but now produced similar levels of congruence between the policy positions of the median voter and the legislature/government. This shift illustrates our central contention that ideological congruence is connected to the election rules by a number of causal steps and this lack of proximity, as well as the role of multiple behavioral processes, renders it relatively vulnerable to contextual conditions like polarization.

Conclusion

The framework we have laid out in this essay is not specific to the outcomes we have discussed, and ought to apply to numerous other important political outcomes—such as government stability and accountability, descriptive representation, the extent of party cohesion, the nature of the linkage between politicians and citizens, types of policies emphasized by the national government, and the degree to which politicians engage in corrupt practices. Our argument is not simply that context matters and that all analysis must be country-specific. There is no reason to think that every unique feature of a given country will mediate the effects of electoral rules. Specific contextual conditions shape the effects of electoral rules in specific ways. Where rules have mechanical effects, involving no human discretion, contextual factors will have little influence, but that where outcomes are a product of human behavior, contextual factors may be powerful forces.

Armed with this information, constitutional engineers will be better able to design institutions. Understanding the effects of electoral rules and specific contextual factors is important for any country, but especially so for new democracies that are only just beginning to implement new constitutions and electoral systems, and may have markedly different social, economic, and political foundations from established democracies.

Electoral Rules and Political Inclusion

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The inclusion of members of politically salient social categories within elected parliaments is an essential part of the democratic process. Legislatures that do not reflect
Party-centric contests make the personal characteristics of individual candidates less influential as voting cues. At the same time, the increased number of parties reduces the electoral threshold of representation, providing more potential avenues for the election of a diverse set of candidates. Conversely, when confronted with candidate-centered elections, all else equal, voters and parties have fewer incentives to support women and ethnic minorities. Faced with a higher electoral threshold and the increased importance of candidate traits in SMDs, parties and voters are more apt to support candidates viewed as “safe and mainstream” who they see as more likely to win election. Moreover, as Iversen and Rosenbluth have noted in relation to gender, the career trajectories of men tend to create the backgrounds and financial/political connections most conducive to election in candidate-centered contests. These socioeconomic disadvantages in SMDs are likely to extend to economically marginalized ethnic minorities as well.

While the disadvantages of SMD elections are similar for female and minority candidates, the advantages of PR display important differences. For women, multi-party competition based on party lists is expected to spur increased demand for and supply of female candidates across the party spectrum through a process of gender-balancing. These dynamics culminate in many instances in the adoption of gender quotas, which are also generally more straightforward to implement in PR systems due to the use of lists. Consequently, parties anticipate electoral rewards for placing women on closed-party lists and penalties for failing to do so. For ethnic minorities, the primary vehicle of representation in PR elections is the ethnic party, in which parties appealing to particular ethnicities emerge due to the lower electoral threshold necessary to gain representation.

Nonetheless, despite widespread agreement that PR tends to be more inclusive of women and ethnic minorities than SMD elections, empirical studies have produced a variety of different findings on this relationship. Matland finds that PR promotes the election of women in advanced democracies, but not developing countries. In contrast, Moser and Scheiner and Moser conclude that PR does not promote the election of women more than SMD elections under certain circumstances. Reynolds, finally, observes that majoritarian elections tend to elect ethnic minorities in greater numbers than PR.

These varied findings suggest that context mitigates the impact these electoral rules have on the election of women and ethnic minorities. For example, the PR advantage for women preserves that parties will see the nomination of women as an electorally advantageous endeavor and electoral thresholds will be lower under PR than SMD. In party systems with dramatic party fragmentation even in plurality elections, women can gain election at higher rates in SMDs due to lower electoral thresholds. Yet they may
gain less representation in PR elections due to lower party magnitude, which results in small parties that do not elect members from far enough down their party lists to reach female candidates.47

In societies with biases against women, female candidates are unlikely to gain election under any electoral system.48 As Moser and Scheiner show, in states with low support for women as political leaders and high party fragmentation—for example, postcommunist states—women are elected at the same rates under both PR and SMD rules.49 At the same time, women’s higher socioeconomic status may lessen the disadvantages of candidate-centered elections for women by enlarging the pool of viable female candidates. In short, the impact that different electoral systems have on the election of women is contingent upon factors—cultural attitudes toward women, the socioeconomic status of women, and party system characteristics—that can lessen the disadvantages of SMDs and undermine the advantages of PR.

As for the PR advantage in the election of ethnic minorities, different contextual factors can disrupt the logic that, in ethnically divided states, more parties under PR give rise to ethnic parties that can serve as a vehicle for minority representation. In particular, demographic characteristics of specific ethnic groups can alter the incentives for parties and voters to support minority candidates. Ethnic minorities that are geographically concentrated may reach a critical mass that prompts large, mainstream parties to nominate minority candidates in these regions. Under such conditions, SMD elections may result in similar or even greater levels of minority representation than PR elections.50

Yet the logic of ethnic parties serving as the main avenue of minority representation rests on a presumption of ethnic voting. However, the level of ethnic voting may vary across countries and groups and thus alter incentives for the formation of ethnic parties and the nomination of minority candidates by mainstream parties. Moser finds, for example, that more assimilated ethnic minorities in Russia manage to gain election to the national legislature in roughly equal numbers under the PR and SMD tiers of the mixed-member electoral system.51 Popular attitudes toward minorities can have the same effect, as Reynolds notes with the ethos of inclusion in South Africa and its effect in facilitating the nomination of minority candidates in parties across the political spectrum.52 Thus, to an even greater extent than women’s representation, the effects of electoral systems on the election of ethnic minorities are contingent upon the broader context.

Electoral Regulations and Group Representation

Electoral regulations are provisions specifically designed to increase the election of a particular group. These policies have received a variety of labels, but are most often described as “quotas,” “reservations,” or “majority-minority districts.” Like electoral rules, electoral regulations are subject to significant internal variation based on the location of the mandate at the state or party level, the proportion of seats affected, the existence of placement provisions, the specificity of requirements, and mechanisms of enforcement.

Preferential rules have gained prominence recently in discussions of political inclusion due to their introduction in a broad array of countries, most within the last ten to fifteen years. In all, more than 100 countries have witnessed the adoption of gender quotas with slightly less than half being introduced through legal or constitutional reform. Diversity in their design means that quotas have not led to a uniform rise in women’s representation: some countries see strong increases, while others witness more modest changes or even setbacks in the proportion of women elected. Most explanations for these variations focus not on aspects of the broader social, economic, and political context, but rather to differences in their design and how they interact with other types of political institutions.53

Contextual elements, however, have featured prominently in accounts of gender quota introduction.54 The mobilization of women’s groups inside and outside parties, for example, has been seen as crucial in getting quotas on the political agenda, both in well-established democracies55 and in societies experiencing dramatic changes in political transitions or reconstruction following years of violent conflict.56 Indeed, demands for quotas may be particularly effective during periods of democratic transition, as the policy may be seen to help establish the legitimacy of the new political system.57

Case studies also signal the strategic incentives of elites in pursuing quota reform, which may emerge at moments of heightened competition among political parties58 or when party leaders and incumbents seek to portray themselves—usually insincerely—as open to women and their concerns.59 The support of international and transnational actors is an additional factor, with many international organizations—most notably the United Nations—issuing declarations recommending that member-states aim for 30 per cent women in all political bodies.60 The states that are most subject to international and transnational influence tend to be post-conflict societies and developing countries, where outside actors may play a larger role in shaping electoral structures via moral or material pressures.61 Quotas featured prominently, for example, in discussions surrounding the creation of new political structures in the wake of the Arab Spring.62

Measures for minorities, in comparison, exist in nearly forty countries and apply to a wide array of groups—many, but not all, of which may be subsumed under the “ethnic minority” label. Nearly all involve reserved seats, although the proportion and identities in question vary enormously across cases. These policies tend to have one of two goals: “protection” or power-sharing, highlighting
the importance of national context in defining salient groups and their share of reserved seats.53

Protection entails allocating seats to groups that constitute a relatively small contingent of the population, including indigenous peoples, members of minority religions and nationalities, and class- or caste-based groups. The provisions are generally minimal, involving as little as one or two percent of all seats.64 In instances of protection, the aim is often to compensate for past oppression. Reserved seats typically numerically over-represent the minority in question.65 Historical grounds often trump other considerations and include dealing with colonial legacies.66 Although transnational influences have grown more important both in cases of conflict and as a means for promoting indigenous rights.67

In contrast, power-sharing arrangements involve dividing up most or all seats in the legislature between two or more factions, defined by ethnicity, religion, or language. These policies entail a higher proportion of seats, often as much as 25 to 70 percent, and exist in most regions, including Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. In cases of power-sharing, the goal is to ensure democratic stability in a divided society.68 Reserved seats grant group members a guaranteed voice in the political system as a means for preventing their defection which, it is feared, might provoke collapse of the state.69 In the wake of conflict, several countries have devised power-sharing provisions based on historical practices of group representation as part of international efforts to promote consociational political arrangements.70

**Tensions in Promoting Political Inclusion**

Many scholars expect women and ethnic minorities to gain election through different avenues. As Htun has observed, these different routes to electoral representation tend to be translated into distinct institutional mechanisms—quotas for women and reserved seats for minorities.71 One consequence of these differences may be that electoral rules, in particular PR, may result in outcomes that favor one social category at the expense of the other. Ethnic minorities, particularly smaller groups, arguably benefit from a more fragmented party system with smaller parties that give rise to ethnic parties. However, women tend to gain election through larger, mainstream parties that require a higher party magnitude—the likelihood of winning more seats in a given district—to reach female candidates further down the party list.

In general, through the manipulation of district magnitude or legal thresholds, PR systems can promote either more fragmented party systems with many parties and low electoral thresholds or less fragmented party systems with fewer parties and higher electoral thresholds. Moreover, ethnic parties themselves may undermine the election of women through their emphasis on ethnic cleavages.72 Preferential electoral rules, in particular gender quotas with placement mandates, can potentially remedy this situation by removing party magnitude as a factor in women’s representation and requiring all parties to nominate women in winnable positions.73

On the other hand, preferential electoral regulations may also lead to tradeoffs in political inclusion. By targeting one social category, preferential rules such as quotas, reserved seats, and majority-minority seats may undermine the election of the other historically marginalized groups that are not targeted. Crucially, in most countries where such regulations exist, only one group is likely to receive representational guarantees.74 Such dynamics can be addressed explicitly during quota debates, such that the granting of quota policies for one group opens up—rather than forecloses—options for further groups.75

Moreover, as scholars of “intersectionality” have argued, focusing exclusively on one dimension of exclusion—for example, sex or race but not both—can strengthen dominant subgroups over marginalized ones.76 For instance, as Hughes shows, countries with minority quotas tend to elect fewer women than countries without measures to increase minority representation. However, in cases where electoral regulations are in place for both women and ethnic minorities (“tandem quotas”), elections have sometimes markedly increased the election of minority women.77 A closer look suggests, nonetheless, that this can come at the cost of electing majority women and minority men—and can in fact bolster the electoral share of majority men in the process.78

**Conclusions**

Debates over the political inclusion of marginalized groups have emerged in recent decades leading to flourishing—although often disparate—literatures on electoral structures and group representation. We review and reflect upon this research as it concerns women and ethnic minorities, highlighting some parallels but also some crucial differences when it comes to designing electoral institutions that might facilitate the greater inclusion of these two groups. A notable finding is that distinct electoral rules may shape the electoral prospects of women and ethnic minorities in opposing ways, although there is by no means a firm consensus within the literature—highlighting, in turn, the importance of the broader social, economic, and cultural context in mediating the effects of electoral structures.

The tendency to focus on women or ethnic minorities has led to a compartmentalization of research, limiting opportunities for cross-fertilization of insights. Moreover, it has contributed to a general oversight of individuals—minority women—who lie at the intersections of these identities and thus are doubly marginalized, not only in politics but also in the literatures. This combined state of affairs points to a rich frontier for potential future research, deepening existing insights on women and minorities.
exploring tensions and complementarities among these two groups, and taking a serious look at how intersectionally marginalized groups fare, all in relation to the rules, regulations, and contextual factors that shape the contours and outcomes of the political process.

**Why Ballot Structure Matters**

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By shaping the collective action of political parties, ballot structure exerts a critical impact on the depth and nature of political competition. Does competition occur only between parties or also within them? Ballot structure also enables (or constrains) the ability of voters to monitor and sanction the performance of individual legislators, thus shaping the balance between individual and collective accountability.

Before turning to these relationships, it is worth asking what, exactly, is ballot structure? When we speak of ballot structure, our attention is drawn to one critical variable: does the ballot permit voters to cast a vote below the party level or only at that level? Do voters have a choice of candidates within a party, or not? Where the ballot permits a candidate-level vote, there are “open” ballots. In a “closed” ballot structure, the vote is strictly at the party level. The second dimension of ballot structure considers what happens after the vote is cast. Does it stay only with the candidate for whom it was cast, or does it “pool” at the level of the party? If there is vote pooling, the vote is counted not only toward the individual candidate but also toward a list of candidates nominated by a party (or alliance of parties). The two dimensions of ballot structure are depicted in Figure 2.

These differences in ballot structure shape the collective action of political parties. A party is like any other collective actor: it functions as a unitary organization only to the extent that the incentives of its individual members are aligned with whatever are the collective goals of the organization. The dominant collective goal of a party is to win seats in the legislature. Most other party goals, such as forming or affecting the support of governments, passing policy, etc., are subordinate to this task. The key impact of ballot structure lies in its potential to reinforce or undercut this goal. If ballot structure permits votes below the party level, it may undermine to varying degrees the alignment of these collective goals and the individual goals of its candidates and legislators.

Open ballot structure—even with, but especially without, vote-pooling—potentially threatens the collective action of political parties by pitting a party’s candidates against one another for seats whenever the party has more candidates than seats it could possibly win. In multi-seat districts, such as those used for either type of PR or for Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) or Single Transferable Vote (STV) systems, parties need to reconcile the incentives of their competing candidates with the collective pursuits of the party as a whole.

This is not to say that the collective action of political parties is determined only by ballot structure. The electoral system—of which ballot structure is a critical variable—is not destiny. There are other factors of party organization and the broader political context that also may work to reinforce or undermine collective action. Some parties are organized around a specific ideology or programmatic agenda; in such parties, organizational tools such as candidate selection rules and disciplinary tactics (e.g., offering or denying desirable intra-legislative or executive posts) may be used to stymie the careers of the insufficiently committed, and in any case, potential candidates will tend to self-select based on their commitment to the party’s broader political goals. Other parties are more loosely identified with any specific policy commitments, or are “clientelistic” (organized around the exchange of material benefits). In addition, the executive format shapes the individual–collective balance in parties independently of the electoral system, with parliamentary systems enhancing collective cohesion more than presidential systems. For all these reasons and more, we should not be overly disappointed when a direct link between ballot structure and various outcome variables of interest is not immediately apparent. We must be cognizant of what it is that ballot structure does, as well as how it fits into the broader context.

**The Impact of District Magnitude**

District magnitude, M, is the number of seats in a district. When we have single-seat districts, M=1, and only one candidate per party, then any limitations on collective action of a party are not the result of ballot structure. Candidates may have a strong incentive to emphasize their personal qualities, but not for the purpose of standing out from copartisans in the general election. Thus this section will focus on variation in district magnitude among those systems with M>1. The main systems using multi-seat districts can be arrayed on a continuum from most party-centric to increasingly candidate-centric as follows:  

- Closed list > Semi-open lists > Open lists > STV > SNTV
When lists are closed, the only competition within the party occurs in advance of the election, over who gets the best (or “safest”) list ranks. Thus, once the election comes around, we have perfectly aligned incentives between individual candidates and their party: if the party prospers, as a collective actor with a brand identity among voters, the candidate’s chances of election increase. Candidates thus have an overriding incentive to cultivate a party vote.\(^81\)

However, with any other ballot structure, there is at least some chance that candidates’ entrepreneurial activities can increase their election chances independent of the party reputation. The greater the weight the rules put on candidate votes rather than a pre-fixed list order (if there is one), the more the candidates have an incentive to cultivate a personal vote. As Carey and Shugart noted, when there is vote pooling as well as open ballots (i.e., open and semi-open lists), the incentive to cultivate a personal vote would tend to be somewhat lower than in the pure candidate-based systems, STV and SNTV.\(^82\) Of these, the former allows copartisan candidates to exchange preferences with one another and run as teams, whereas the latter maximizes the direct competition between individuals. When we bring district magnitude into the picture, as in the simplified form of Carey and Shugart’s hypothesis depicted in Figure 3, we see that the incentive to cultivate a personal vote is shown decreasing with district magnitude with closed ballots, and increasing with magnitude with open ballots.

Given closed ballots, the value of the personal vote decreases as magnitude increases, because only pre-election party ranks, rather than personal campaigning, affect the election of candidates. However, given small magnitude, with a correspondingly smaller number of candidates, the activities of the leading (and perhaps also marginal) candidates to highlight their personal record or characteristics may affect their election chance by drawing voters who would not otherwise have voted for the party.

On the other hand, when ballots are open, increased magnitude increases the incentive to cultivate a personal vote. When candidate-preference votes determine candidates’ order of election, as under open lists, SNTV, or STV, only those candidates who are successful at drawing votes to themselves are likely to prosper. As \(M\) increases, typically each candidate in a party must compete against a greater number of copartisans. As a result, higher \(M\) implies increasing incentive to distinguish oneself in order to stand out in the larger crowd. The effect should be similar under semi-open lists, albeit attenuated, to the extent that the rules may permit many candidates to win based on having “safe” list ranks provided by their party.

**Impact on Legislative Behavior**

The literature regarding the effect of electoral institutions on the behavior in the legislative arena is an established and fast-growing sub-field.\(^93\) Now, I will examine the impact of ballot structure on democratic accountability, specifically on whether legislative structure and behavior are geared towards legislators’ desire to be personally recognized by, and rewarded by, groups of voters (individual accountability) or towards enhancing the collective reputations of parties (collective accountability).
With open ballots, the threat to an individual legislator’s pursuit of reelection—or to any new candidate’s prospects of first election—come primarily from other candidates of the same party (or political “camp”). This threat supplies the motivational drive to use the scarce perquisites of office in order to nurture a personal reputation.\textsuperscript{84} Ballot structure enables and constrains voters’ abilities to monitor and sanction legislators’ performance and shapes the balance of individual vs. collective accountability. For instance, if parties control nominations but voters determine ranks on a list, legislators answer to multiple principals, which creates potential problems for the cohesiveness of the party in the legislature.\textsuperscript{85}

The legislator who is the sole representative of the district bears the responsibility of promoting its interests.\textsuperscript{86} In those circumstances constituents have only the actions of one legislator to monitor, increasing the name recognition of the legislator.\textsuperscript{87} When constituents are represented by many legislators, on the other hand, the cost of monitoring quickly exceeds the time and effort rationally ignorable. They can be inferred only from the behavioral patterns they instigate.\textsuperscript{89}

Where ballots are closed, voters have no means to sanction individuals even if they are aware of undesirable traits or actions by one or more of them; all they can do is sanction the party as a whole by voting for a different one next time. Thus the collective accountability of parties should be at its maximum extent (other things equal) when we have the combination of relatively high magnitude and closed ballots. When ballots are open, in principle voters have the option to sanction an incumbent for poor performance and vote for a co-partisan instead. However, there is often a tension between competitiveness and accountability: on the one hand, higher intra-party competition implies a strong incentive for individual legislators to cultivate ties to voters (as argued in the previous section). On the other hand, the more candidates who are in competition for a limited number of seats, the less effective individual “credit-claiming” for services rendered can be. When responsibility is divided among several legislators, each seeking personal votes, the ability to hold any one of them accountable for his or her actions is lessened.

Empirical research linking incentives to cultivate a personal vote with legislative behavior faces a fundamental problem: while the incentives of different ballot structure can be clearly articulated, incentives, per se, are unobservable. They can be inferred only from the behavioral patterns they instigate.\textsuperscript{89} Some legislators initiate bills or amendments that primarily benefit their local community; others hold frequent surgeries and redress constituents’ grievances; and still others take positions defying the party whip. It is important to recognize that, though one personal vote-seeking strategy may be substituted for another,\textsuperscript{90} most research has focused on a single indicator of personal vote-seeking at a time,\textsuperscript{91} thereby risking an under-estimation of personal vote-seeking.\textsuperscript{92}

As noted above, there are tensions between collective and individual incentives in political parties. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that party leaders frequently have the ability directly to affect the behavioral repertoires that a legislators’ personal reputation is built on. The ability to prevent legislators’ personal-vote activity from undermining the party as a whole critically depends on the means of the party leadership to monitor and sanction individual behavior: career advancement, staff allocation, procedural advantages in the legislative arena (e.g., through committee assignment and agenda control).\textsuperscript{93} More importantly, parties often control access to the party label by controlling nominations.

**Conclusion**

Ballot structure can reinforce or undermine the collective action of political parties. When ballots permit voters to make only a single choice, the structure reinforces the collective action of a party by aligning the incentives of the candidate (get more votes, be more electorally secure) with those of the party (win another seat). When the ballot structure is open, voters are able to make one or more choices of candidates below the level of the party. This structure tends to undermine the collective action of a party because it pits candidates of the same party against one another. Variations within open ballots—for example, open and semi-open (flexible) lists, ranked-choice ballots, non-transferable votes that are not also party votes—can further shape the degree to which ballot structure affects parties. Numerous other factors also shape parties’ collective action, and thus ballot structure is not destiny. It does, however, critically shape the relationships among voters, candidates, and political parties.

**Consequences of Electoral Rules for Patterns of Redistribution and Regulation**

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One of the fastest growing areas of research on electoral systems in political science and political economy has been on the effects of electoral systems on policy outcomes. This agenda has sparked some lively controversies among prominent scholars. It has also generated new theoretical ideas and new datasets with which these ideas have been tested. Research has focused on the effects of electoral systems on a wide range of policy issues, including:

- redistribution of wealth through taxation and progressive social welfare policies;
- redistribution of wealth through regulatory policies that affect consumer prices;
- fiscal restraint versus profligacy of governments as measured by size of the public sector and government deficits;
• government intervention in markets to protect workers and local industries;
• levels of protectionism through tariffs, subsidies, exchange rate policies, and regulations on FDI; and
• the relative priority policymakers place on providing broad public goods versus goods targeted at narrow constituencies.

Most arguments about how and why electoral systems shape policy outcomes rest on a distinction between “narrow” versus “broad” socio-economic interests, advancing claims that the type of competition engendered by a particular electoral system favors one sort of interest or the other. But how scholars conceive of narrowness and breadth, and the nature of the tradeoff between them, varies markedly. We see five distinct types of stories about what constitutes narrowness and breadth—that is, whose economic interests are properly conceived as narrow and whose as broad. Each type of story, moreover, is associated with a particular set of claims about how specific electoral systems shape the narrow/broad tradeoff.

The five main stories differ on whether narrow versus broad ought to be conceived according to level of wealth, economic sector, access to economic rents, geography, or non-geographic characteristics that nevertheless allow for targeted policies. We discuss each of these accounts in turn, but we match the first three and the last two because the theoretical foundations of these sets are most directly comparable.

**Redistribution: Governing Coalitions, Voter Leverage, and Rents**

The first approach takes as a starting point the fact that the distribution of wealth in every democracy is skewed such that the median voter’s wealth is below the mean level, so that a progressive redistribution of wealth could appeal to electoral majorities. From that premise, narrow interests are those of the minority rich, whereas broad interests are those of the numerically larger middle class and poor groups. In a competing approach, by contrast, the narrow versus broad distinction is not about level of wealth, but about economic sector. Those whose livelihoods derive directly from domestic industries whose production costs and market positions are shaped by government regulatory policies are characterized as narrow, whereas broad interests are those of all others in low consumer prices.

The key division in this literature is over how electoral rules act as a source of the relative political leverage for the narrow versus the broad. The landmark arguments here are advanced by Iversen and Soskice (and Cusack) on one side, and by Rogowski (with various co-authors) on the other, and by Persson and Tabellini (and Roland), who offer combinations and alternative permutations of arguments from both sides.34 For the Iversen and Soskice camp, redistribution primarily takes the form of taxation by the government and transfers from richer to poorer groups, so the crucial form of government intervention in the economy is progressive. On the other hand, for the Rogowski et al. camp, the vehicles of redistribution are regulatory and trade policies that favor the narrow interests of producer groups, but raise prices for everyone. Consequently, they characterize government intervention in the economy as primarily regressive.35 For Persson and Tabellini, redistribution takes the form of rents extracted from state coffers by politicians and political parties, both in the form of fiscal transfers and regulatory protection for favored groups. In both of these latter cases, the effect of government intervention in the economy is to transfer resources from the broader population to politically privileged constituencies, and so is regarded as regressive. The logics of the various arguments are as follows.

Iversen and Soskice start with a three-class model of society: low (L), middle (M), and high (H) income citizens.36 Governments have three options: (A) no redistribution; (B) moderate redistribution, from H to M and L; or (C) radical redistribution, from H and M to L. L prefers C to B to A, M prefers B to A to C, and H prefers A to B to C. The electoral system shapes policy outcomes by influencing which parties exist and which governments form. Proportional representation (PR) systems lead to one party representing each of group (L, M, and H) and coalition governments either between LM or MH. M is the pivotal player and can decide which government forms. M’s first choice is to coalesce with L to pursue a policy that redistributes from H to M and L. As a result, PR systems lead to moderate levels of redistribution (e.g. high levels of public spending).

Single-member district (SMD) systems, meanwhile, lead to two parties: LM and MH. M is split between the parties, and is hence weaker than the other group within the respective party. As a result, M cannot guarantee that its partner will not seize control of policy and pursue its own first preference: policy C (radical redistribution) in the case of LM, or policy A (no redistribution) in the case of MH. Unable to guarantee itself policy B, and preferring A to C, M’s voters prefer to ally with group H under SMD competition. The consequence is lower levels of economic redistribution in SMD systems compared to PR systems. Note that the argument hinges on SMD competition yielding a policy outcome that deviates from the median group’s preference whereas PR competition allows the median group to determine policy.

In contrast, Rogowski and Kayser focus on how electoral rules shape the relationship between the proportion of votes parties receive and the proportion of seats they win.37 Because vote swings between parties lead to disproportionately larger seat swings under SMD than under PR, the value of the marginal vote is higher under SMD.

As a result, parties pay closer attention to the median
voter in SMD systems, while politicians in PR systems are more likely to be “captured” by producer interests that deviate from median voter preferences.98

The level of consumer prices is the main policy manifestation of the differing electoral incentives in SMD versus PR. Consumers make up the larger share of the electorate, and thus include the median voter, who prefers policies that yield lower consumer prices. Such policies include lower import tariffs, a lighter regulatory footprint, and more competition among producers. Producers are a smaller group than consumers, and prefer policies that yield higher consumer prices (and so, producer rents), such as import duties, regulatory standards that protect favored sectors, industrial subsidies and industrial concentration. If politicians in SMD systems are more keenly attuned to consumers than are politicians in PR systems, then consumer prices should be lower in the former and higher in the later. The empirical evidence supports this proposition.

Persson and Tabellini develop a similar logic to Rogowski et al., embracing the seat-vote elasticity premise to argue that competition between politicians and parties is stiffer under SMD than PR, and therefore that politicians will be more responsive to voters in SMD systems.79 This not only relates to the policies politicians deliver to secure their re-election (the primary focus of Rogowski et al.), but also the policies politicians pursue to promote their own personal interests, such as seeking political rents and engaging in corruption. The policy consequences, they suggest, are that SMD systems lead to fewer public goods, but also lower rents for politicians than PR systems.100

Building on this argument, Persson, Roland and Tabellini contend that electoral rules also have indirect policy consequences, via their impact on party and government formation.101 This would appear to put Persson, Roland, and Tabellini on the same page as Iversen and Soskice,102 but whereas Iversen and Soskice focus on spatial coalitions between parties and groups, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini focus on accountability and efficiency.103 Specifically, SMD systems lead to fewer parties, which makes single-party government more likely, clarifying government accountability and yielding more efficient policies. In contrast, PR systems lead to more parties and incentives for each party in a coalition government to spend money on its own supporters while free riding on the accountability deficit implied by lower clarity of responsibility.

These authors derive opposing inferences about policy outcomes from the same sets of electoral rules in part because they define narrow and broad interests differently. All might agree that PR rules are more likely than SMDs to yield labor market regulations that boost industrial wages and compensation, but Iversen and Soskice interpret this outcome as redistribution from “citizens” in the “narrow” (richer) category to those in the “broad” (poorer) category, whereas Rogowski et al. see the same policies as redistributing from “broad” (consumer) to “narrow” (producer) interests, and Persson et al. see political and economic rents. But Persson, Roland, and Tabellini also suggest a way to reconcile Iversen and Soskice with Rogowski et al.104 Median voters may favor both moderate redistribution via taxation and transfer (per Iversen and Soskice) and low consumer prices (per Rogowski et al.), and PR systems may tend to produce cabinets with pivotal parties closer to the median voter than do SMD systems.105 In the operation of coalition government, however, the pivotal centrist party may be better able to deliver on its fiscal promises of moderate redistribution than on its commitment to refrain from regulatory policy that drives up consumer prices, owing precisely to the spending dynamics and the common pool resource problems that Persson and Tabellini et al. emphasize.

Several other authors support the claim that PR encourages more progressive redistribution of wealth than does SMD.106 Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote qualify this claim, maintaining that whereas PR may encourage redistribution in advanced (i.e., OECD) democracies, there is little evidence of this effect in developing countries.107 One explanation may be that the Iversen and Soskice result of progressive redistribution hangs on the logic of government formation in a parliamentary system with party competition along a single, left-right dimension. Under presidentialism or less well-ordered ideological competition among parties, both of which are prevalent in less developed regions, the PR-progressivity logic may not apply. A related line of argument, by Amat and Wibbels, suggests low redistribution under PR in environments where parties have not developed ideological foundations.108

Finally, as with all research based largely on cross-national comparisons, there is the persistent question of identifying causal effects, and specifically the extent to which electoral systems drive policy interventions that affect redistribution, as opposed to the distribution of economic resources driving electoral system choice. Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice acknowledge that the choice of the electoral system might be endogenous, since high local economic coordination appears to have facilitated the adoption of inclusive, PR electoral rules in many European contexts in the early twentieth century.109 Countries with traditionally low economic policy coordination and adversarial relations between employers and craft-based unions tended to choose SMD systems. In contrast, countries with high economic coordination and common interest of employers and industrial unions tended to choose PR.

**Geography: District Magnitude and Policy Incentives**

Narrow and broad interests can be conceived geographically rather than socially. From this perspective, the design of electoral systems shapes whether politicians have incentives to deliver local or regional/national public goods.
The key distinction here is between SMD systems and the rest, perhaps with a further distinction among PR systems according to district magnitude. SMD elections privilege more narrow geographic interests than do PR elections because SMDs mean the geographical scope of each district must necessarily be smaller.\textsuperscript{110} For example, Funk and Gathmann find that PR leads to spending on broader public goods, like education, rather than targeted goods, like roads and agricultural subsidies.\textsuperscript{111} Looking at individual legislators, Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni find that during Italy's use of a mixed electoral system, SMD-elected members supported geographically-targeted spending projects more than PR-elected members did.\textsuperscript{112}

Research in international political economy has mirrored that on public spending, with protectionist trade policies in the role of budget largesse. Several scholars claim that SMDs encourage high tariffs because small districts encourage protection of narrow interests.\textsuperscript{113} Kim finds that politicians in SMD systems tend to restrict mergers and acquisitions more than those in PR systems, arguing that the reason is that SMD representatives are more inclined to protect firms in their home districts that might be adversely affected by mergers and acquisitions. Moving in a slightly different direction, Vernby argues that strikes are more common in SMD systems than in PR systems, and diminish under PR as district magnitude grows.\textsuperscript{114} His explanation is that unions recognize that strikes are more electorally costly to incumbents under SMD, where vote-seat elasticity is greater, and so they deploy that strategy more readily.

However, political competitiveness varies across districts within both SMD and PR systems. A more subtle extension of the general argument that SMD elections encourage narrowly-targeted policy benefits posits that the effect of electoral systems is conditional on district-level characteristics—for example, the geographical concentration of voters with shared interests. The logic rests on the marginal bang-for-the-buck that politicians get from distributing resources in pursuit of votes. Thus, in SMD systems, narrow interests—for example, in subsidies for a particular industry—are more likely to be privileged in policy when voters who share that interest are geographically concentrated, whereas the distribution of such benefits is unrelated to geographical concentration in PR systems.\textsuperscript{115} Rickard also finds that violations of GATT/WTO agreements (which favor narrow sectoral interests) tend to be more frequent in SMD countries than in PR countries.\textsuperscript{116}

There is, however, an additional condition implicit in this account—district-level competitiveness. Politicians only want to lavish additional goods, like subsidies, on a geographically-concentrated voting bloc when that bloc is pivotal. If a group of voters with a shared interest is geographically concentrated, but those districts are either already safely in the government's column or are unwinnable, then policy benefits should be targeted elsewhere. This logic implies a compound conditionality (Electoral System * Geographical Concentration * District-Level Competitiveness) to the effect of electoral system on the geographical concentration of benefits. There is some suggestive evidence in favor of such a relationship. McGillivray advances the case that, under SMD systems, protectionism is targeted at geographically-concentrated industries located in electorally marginal districts.\textsuperscript{117} Neugart also argues that under SMD systems, worker protection tends to be narrowly targeted at voters in pivotal districts,\textsuperscript{118} whereas PR systems encourage policies with broader protection against unemployment because parties need to take the employment risks of all voters into account.\textsuperscript{119}

**Ideological Breadth/Narrowness: Targeted Versus Universal Appeals**

Ideology is an alternative conception of narrowness or breadth of appeal. Park and Jensen, for example, argue that the low thresholds for representation that characterize inclusive PR systems encourage parties organized around appeals to narrow constituencies, which in turn produce high levels of agricultural subsidies and protectionism.\textsuperscript{120} McGillivray argues that the dispersion of stock prices among firms in different industries is an indicator of the degree to which governments favor some economic sectors over others,\textsuperscript{121} and shows that dispersion is generally higher under PR than SMD systems, suggesting more policy favoritism under PR than SMD.\textsuperscript{122}

An extension of this logic posits a conditional effect of ballot structure on district magnitude, whereby intra-party competition in high-magnitude districts encourages candidates to appeal to highly specific (i.e., narrow) groups of voters for personal support.\textsuperscript{123} In high-magnitude districts, which tend to be large and highly populated, these targeted benefits might be geographically specific, but they need not be, and policies targeted by sector or industry, demographic criteria, or partisanship are equally feasible. Crisp and Hankla both present evidence that, under PR, stronger incentives to cultivate a personal vote (as, for example, in open-list or transferable vote systems) encourage protectionism through particularistic subsidies and regulations for targeted industries.\textsuperscript{124} Further empirical results consistent with this are in Bagashka, Naoi and Krauss, Ehrlich, Golden and Picci, Golden and Chang, and Wright.\textsuperscript{125}

**Electoral Systems, the Fiscal Commons, and Economic Growth**

Last but not least, scholarship in political economy has reached beyond examination of targeted benefits to advance even broader claims about the relationship between electoral systems and macroeconomic performance. Since the work of Persson and Tabellini in the late 1990s, there has been growing support, mainly by economists, for the claim...
that SMD systems produce lower government spending, public deficits, and rent-seeking than PR systems.\textsuperscript{126}

The theoretical claims, however, have not gone unchallenged in the empirical literature. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno concur that more proportional systems lead to higher spending in OECD countries, but find no evidence of a difference in Latin America.\textsuperscript{127} Akitoby and Stratmann, meanwhile, present evidence that, contrary to Persson and Tebllini, SMD elections produce higher government spending than PR elections, and more penalization of governments by financial markets via higher bond-yield spreads.\textsuperscript{128}

In work echoing that on targeted benefits, some scholars have distinguished the fiscal incentives generated by strong incentives for personal vote-seeking within PR systems. Under Brazil’s open-list elections, for example, Ames finds that high-magnitude PR with intra-party competition fosters particularistic spending.\textsuperscript{129} With a broader comparative perspective, Hallerberg and Marier find that budget procedures that strengthen the executive’s authority produce lower deficits where the electoral system for legislators generates strong incentives for personal votes, but yield no impact where legislators’ incentives for personal votes are low (for example under closed-list PR).\textsuperscript{130} And Martin and Thomas find that higher district magnitudes tend to produce more public goods provision when elections are party-centered (for example, under closed-lists), but lower overall spending and focus on particularistic goods when elections are candidate-centered (for example, under open-lists).\textsuperscript{131} Bernhard and Leblang and Eichengreen and Leblang argue that SMD elections encourage floating exchange rates because single-party governments value the associated policy flexibility, whereas the coalition governments more prevalent under PR encourage fixed exchange rates as a commitment measure to resolve policy disputes among parties, and as a means for coalition partners to monitor the Finance Ministry.\textsuperscript{132}

Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research

Research on the effects of electoral systems on policy outcomes is at a relatively early stage compared to the decades of work on the impact of electoral systems on the party system, the relationship between vote and seats in parliaments, the number of parties in government, and so on. Nevertheless, a lot of progress has been made in a very short time. There are now some reasonably clear empirical regularities in terms of the effect of the two main types of electoral systems—majoritarian and proportional—on some major economic policies. In particular, whereas PR systems tend to produce higher public spending, majoritarian systems tend to produce lower public deficits and lower consumer prices. Furthermore, at a lower level of aggregation, SMD systems tend to produce policies targeted at pivotal voters in marginal districts, whereas PR systems tend to produce general public goods.

The causal mechanisms behind the connection between electoral systems and these (and other) policy outcomes are not yet fully understood. First, it remains unclear whether the electoral system effects are direct—as a result of different socio-geographic campaigning incentives for parties and politicians under the different electoral systems—or indirect, as a result of the processes of government formation and operation (such as the difference between single-party government and coalition government). Second, only a small number of countries have switched between a majoritarian and a PR system since the 1950s. This means that most of the key empirical results are based on cross-country rather than cross-time variations. The problem with relying on cross-country variation is that it is difficult to identify the effect of electoral systems independently from other factors that vary across countries, such as parties, governments, other political institutions, and voters’ preferences. Electoral systems are also endogenous to political factors that vary across countries, such as the number of parties and the conflictual or consensual nature of societal relations.

Recognizing these challenges, researchers have begun to look at within-country variations. For example, several scholars have looked at mixed-member electoral systems, where politicians in the same country at the same time are elected by either SMD or PR rules. This has allowed researchers to identify the types of policies the two sets of politicians seek. Extrapolating from this micro-level behavior to macro policy outcomes, such as public spending or trade tariffs, is not straightforward. Nevertheless, we believe more can be learned, at both an empirical and a theoretical level, by focusing on the policy effects of changes in electoral rules within countries over time, such as changes in district magnitude or switches from closed-list to open-list PR.

Designing Electoral Systems: Normative Tradeoffs and Institutional Innovations

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Andrew Rehfeld and Melissa Schwartzberg

As many of the essays in this symposium suggest, electoral rules have a dramatic effect on political outcomes. These rules also enable us to achieve different normative ends such as maximizing the likelihood that every citizen votes for a candidate who wins, maximizing the correspondence of policy outcomes to citizen preferences, and ensuring an ethnically diverse legislature, among many other desiderata. Since electoral rules do not equally achieve each of these goals, and since some of these aims are incompatible with some others, the choice of an electoral system will have normative consequences. For instance, in choosing an electoral rule, we may end up having to sacrifice the goal that every citizen votes for a candidate who wins so as
to maximize the likelihood that policy outcomes correspond to majority preferences.

Here we seek to highlight the normative implications of electoral reforms, while recognizing the tradeoffs that instantiating our commitments in political institutions necessarily entail. To preserve even a core value such as political equality in an electoral system may entail unacceptable sacrifices of a competing value—or even a sacrifice of equality on a different dimension. As such, engaging in political experimentation and innovation may be our best hope of expanding the range of institutions available to realize these commitments and of clarifying where our normative priorities rest.

Democracy is committed, in the first instance, to political equality. In ancient Athens, this entailed the equal right to put oneself forward to hold political office and the equal probability, via the lot, of being selected (for most magistracies). Yet it is far from clear what equality among citizens ought to mean in modern representative democracies. Under universal suffrage—one person, one vote—each citizen in principle ought to have equal opportunity to choose the candidate who she believes will best protect her interests. Robert Dahl has famously defined democracy by reference to the “responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.”135 But note that already there are potential tensions between the equal capacity to choose a candidate, and the ability to have one’s preferences count equally: my preferred candidate may have no chance of winning; my candidate, even if elected, may be in the position of a permanent minority and have no means of realizing my policy preferences; and even if elected and in the majority, my representative’s votes may not always track my policy preferences.

Even if we specifically aim to improve political equality in one form, we may end up increasing inequality measured in a different fashion. As Charles Beitz has suggested, we might decide that political equality should obtain primarily in reference to the legislation created rather than to voting or to the likelihood of electing a candidate.134 In that case, a commitment to proportionality may or may not lead to a greater chance of achieving legislative outcomes. Greater homogeneity within the district may increase the capacity of constituents to choose a representative who shares their values and interests, but at the cost of having a representative who may be marginalized once she enters the legislature. This is what David Lublin nicely titled the “Paradox of Representation.”135 The alternative that he suggests is to have minorities remain within single-member districts at a large enough level to affect some moderating influence on the resulting election, even if their numbers are not large enough to elect their own. Although Lublin was discussing only minorities, the point can be generalized to party affiliation as well, were small parties to be represented proportionately in legislatures.

Maximizing political equality in the sense of having representatives who reflect the distinct interests of particular populations may lead to a loss of equality measured in terms of political outcomes.

Although achieving a perfect harmony of values is unattainable, there are dimensions on which our existing electoral institutions fall short and might be subject to improvement. It is worth exploring whether serious institutional innovations might help us to realize our normative aims. History provides evidence that imaginative ideals have led to lasting political changes. When Thomas Hare proposed a proportional system as an alternative to majority rule to elect representatives for the English House of Commons, it was derided for being absurdly complicated because it required every voter to rank order hundreds of candidates on a list. Who would have predicted that his ideas would lead to the single-transferable voting system (“preference voting”) and other forms of proportional representation now in practice today, thanks in part to John Stuart Mill’s own account of Hare’s system in Considerations on Representative Government? Today organizations around the world—from local non-profit groups to national governments—use a variety of these schemes to translate underlying voter preferences into the institutions of government.

Political theorists have recently focused attention on the incentives of representatives to act in ways that may fail to realize the interests of their constituents, or may promote the interests of their constituents at the expense of the national interest or “common good” more generally. Insofar as these issues entail the question of how best to ensure the equal consideration of citizens’ interests, they are importantly connected to the issues of political equality addressed earlier. But they also transcend these issues to raise normative questions of the ethics of political representatives and the responsibility of citizens for monitoring their agents. Two institutional innovations designed to address these issues help us both to clarify both some of the deficiencies in current electoral systems and to reimage the possibilities of electoral democracy.

**Alternative Constituency Design**

Nearly every democracy groups voters into territorial subgroups before counting their vote. This is an historical artifact and may be less important to large states than it was three centuries ago and as it continues to be in smaller communities. The original justification for territorial districts may have been the close ties voters within a district had with one another; a justification that was plausible when the average size of a colonial district was roughly 3,000 people. But today, in the United States for example, electoral constituencies for the House of Representatives number some 600,000 people, much larger than the original number of 30,000 set in the constitution in 1789. And that original number was on average 10 times the size of districts for colonial legislatures.
The fact that electoral constituencies are based on geographical lines creates incentives for representatives to support local spending as part of serving their constituencies. Sometimes this spending is also in the national interest. But at other times, most famously in the “bridge to nowhere,” locally-oriented spending—simply a way to secure votes—reduces resources available to projects of a more general interest. Political biases toward local interests are not natural. Rather, the institutionalization of representation along geographical lines—territorial districting—renders politics local. The alternative would be proportional representation in which electoral constituencies are essentially formed by voters who cast a vote for national parties. Other alternatives include functional representation and representing individuals by profession or other organized interests. These systems would not eliminate special-interest spending in the name of the national good, so much as they move local spending to spending on other interests on which the constituency is defined (e.g., interest group, political party, and profession).

Thomas Pogge has gone so far as to recommend “self-constituting constituencies” that would allow individuals to have their votes counted in whatever way they choose. Such an alternative has the benefit of leaving to the group the manner by which they are represented, and to define for them what it means, for example, to be represented as a woman, even as it raises the likelihood that one of its own members is elected. Pogge’s recommendation maximizes the value of autonomy by placing the choice of a constituency in the hands of voters. But autonomy at the level of constituency definition is likely to leave districts more homogenous since they will attract like-minded voters (each of whom wants to be represented by their party identification, or by their interest in whatever feature it is by which they would choose to be defined). This may generate the paradox of representation described earlier, making it more desirable to sacrifice autonomy in order to achieve better policy outcomes.

In contrast to territorial representation or more concentrated-interest representation, we can imagine electoral constituencies that are defined by the national interest, rather than the interest of a part. This could involve randomizing the assignment of citizens to permanent, involuntary, heterogeneous electoral constituencies, producing non-territorial districts in which each would look like the nation as a whole. In a legislature of, say, 435 seats (the number in Congress) each voter would randomly draw a number between 1 and 435 (inclusive), and she would be a member of that constituency for the rest of her life. The random district would reduce partisanship, by having each representative pursue their own constituents’ interests even as that would mean pursuing the nation’s interest as a whole. In addition, the permanence of such districts would enable the same group of voters to authorize a representative to act for them and then reward or punish this person at election time.

The use of randomization is in part designed to promote the inclusion of diverse social groups. The membership of each constituency would be national, and demographically identical to each other, as well as to the nation as a whole. The median voter would not only prevail within a constituency but nationally. The hope, often implicitly, is that through capturing the diversity of the citizen body as a whole, the institutions will better reflect either the common good or at least not be subject to the systematic distortions and partiality associated with electoral systems (again, perhaps most importantly, wealth). The resulting policy implication is that issues for which there are clear national majorities would have constant support within Congress. But issues on which the nation is divided would be the primary ones on the basis of which representatives might distinguish themselves from each other.

Since the constituents of each district would be nationally distributed, campaigns would not find it effective to advertise using broadcast media, but only through direct e-communications, dramatically lowering the costs of campaigns and thus reducing the influence of media in politics. And in Congress, spending and other decisions would still be based on serving the good of a representative’s constituents, but now the constituency’s interests and the nation’s interests would be identical.

**Accountability and the Euthynai**

That elections are insufficient for accountability is a familiar and justifiable lament. Monitoring one’s representatives is very costly for voters, even aided by opposing parties, and representatives have an incentive to conceal bargains that constituents would reject. Further, the bluntness of the vote makes it imperfect as a mechanism of retrospective accountability for several reasons, among them that it entails both a retrospective assessment of the representative’s performance in office, which is itself comprised of a multitude of votes, and a prospective judgment as to whether an opponent is likely to perform better.

In recent years, theorists have begun to defend the value of extra-electoral mechanisms of political accountability. Jeffrey Green has recently argued that the primary role of the people in contemporary democracy is to be “spectators” of their leaders, and, as such, the critical ideal ought to be candor: “the institutional requirement that leaders not be in control of the conditions of their publicity.” He defends the increased use of public inquiries, in which leaders are subject to explicitly political investigation and trial, holding that they would encourage direct scrutiny while removing the power from the leaders under examination to shape the spectacle. John McCormick praises Machiavelli’s defense of political trials, and urges contemporary republicans to endorse them.
as a means of improving the accountability of representatives and of fostering citizens' control over the wealthy elites who today dominate political offices.140

Though Green in particular offers suggestions for how some of the obvious risks associated with political trials might be mitigated, nonetheless, we might still not wish to develop a political institution that could so readily be subject to partisan abuse. Nor would we necessarily want an accusatory framework for such an accountability mechanism. Yet the public nature of rendering accounts, especially given the incentives on the part of incumbents to obfuscate features of their record, might well have benefits. Ancient Athens offers a model of one such mechanism. Magistrates and other public officials in Athens were subject to scrutiny after their term in office, a mechanism of "rendering accounts" called euthynai. A first stage was focused on financial improprieties, but the second phase entailed a mechanism by which any citizen or metic could present a written accusation of malfeasance; if the "corrector" for the magistrate's tribe deemed the charge justified, it would be handled by public or private prosecution.141

One might suggest that such an institution is unnecessary, because opposing candidates will have an incentive to monitor and disclose evidence of wrongdoing or simply votes that are at odds with the public interest, as construed by the competing candidate. However, because the opposing candidate herself has a strong incentive to characterize the record in a negative light or to misrepresent the incumbent's position, there is reason to think that the voters would not, and should not, necessarily trust the challenger's presentation of the incumbent's performance. As such, and given the limited incentives on the part of the incumbent herself to provide a full rendering of her performance, an additional mechanism might be necessary.

Imagine a public hearing at which the incumbent would present her voting record as well as perhaps other evidence of her performance in office, and would be subject to challenge on this record by a panel of judges. Though it is surely the case that this would expose the incumbent to substantial criticism, which might well benefit the challenger, it is not obvious that this is unattractive; the incumbency advantage is so strong that mitigating it on the basis of a careful and clear evidence should not raise serious concerns. Further, to the extent that the prospect of this scrutiny encourages closer relationships with constituents and public reason-giving for unpopular decisions, the performance of representatives might be enhanced.

One might ask how different the euthynai is from what the free press already does in contemporary society. Journalists regularly compel politicians to render accounts in public forums such as press conferences and televised interviews. Citizens also participate in this process by submitting questions, a process that the growth of the internet has facilitated. Yet the profit interests of the media and its penchant for spectacle frequently reduce the process of rendering accounts to the exchange of sound bites. The public emerges more entertained than informed. Nonetheless, as Green would argue, stripping away the leaders' own power to orchestrate the euthynai makes it a spectacle worthy of public observation.

Conclusion

Choices between electoral rules entail compromises and tradeoffs among different values—and even the particular manifestation of these values, as the discussion of political equality suggested. Within democracies, there is likely to be disagreement about the relative weight that should be ascribed to these values. Because of the technical nature of electoral systems, citizen engagement in electoral reform tends to be relatively limited—except, perhaps, where redistricting is concerned. But, as we hope to have shown, the normative consequences of electoral design are significant.

Though there are serious costs associated with instability in an electoral system, there are also substantial liabilities to sclerosis: electoral reform in many ways constitutes an ongoing process. Remarkably, perhaps because of the desire to enable electoral rules to remain flexible enough to cope with important demographic or political changes, electoral rules are rarely given constitutional status. Although the flexibility of electoral rules may generate an incentive for temporarily dominant parties to lock in advantages, it also provides citizens and their representatives an opportunity to ensure that electoral rules reflect their normative commitments—indeed, an opportunity to reflect on the nature of these commitments and their limits. The realization of our ambitions for democracy more generally, however, may require us to think creatively about institutional innovations beyond elections.

Political Scientists as Electoral System Engineers
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John Carey, Simon Hix, Mala Htun, Shaheen Mozaffar, G. Bingham Powell, and Andrew Reynolds

Participation by social scientists in the design of democratic institutions generally, and electoral systems specifically, has a long—if not always happy—pedigree. The involvement of the legal theorist Hugo Preuss and the sociologist Max Weber in the construction of the Weimar Constitution is well documented.142 In more recent years, political scientists143—and electoral system scholars in particular—have been invited, with increasing frequency, to provide guidance to electoral reformers, sometimes via governmental and diplomatic contacts, other times through non-governmental organizations, and other times via academic institutions.144 Events of the Arab Spring and regime changes in the Middle East and Central Asia have created a “boom” in demand for electoral advising.
To explore the role of political scientists as engineers, we conducted a multi-method research project consisting of surveys, case studies, and personal interviews. To capture the preferences of political scientists vis-à-vis electoral rules, we conducted a small survey of APSA members. We administered a second survey to political scientists and other experts who had served as advisors or consultants during episodes of electoral reform. Our research revealed that political scientists have, among other things, presented political parties and legislative commissions with a blueprint for a new election system, drawn lists of options for stakeholders at regional meetings, conducted shuttle diplomacy between government and opposition in the halls of the United Nations headquarters, trained the staff of democracy promotion organizations, and planted the seeds of new ideas—such as Alternative Voting (AV)—in the minds of government officials.

**What Political Scientists Think**

Few electoral systems are able to achieve all desirable goals simultaneously. Designing electoral systems thus requires clarifying priorities and accepting tradeoffs. A classic tradeoff is between the inclusion of political and social diversity on the one hand and government accountability on the other. The conventional wisdom maintains that most electoral systems can produce either inclusive parliaments that reflect the diversity of public opinion or a decisive government that voters can identify and reward (or punish) at election time (but not both simultaneously). 145 Most democratic polities tend to emphasize one set of priorities or the other: they are oriented around either a proportional or a majoritarian vision. 146

To explore the priorities of political scientists, we administered an Internet-based survey to a random sample of APSA members, asking them to rank the importance of different electoral system goals and their opinions about different electoral systems. Political scientists placed the highest value on the goal of accountability of individual legislators, closely followed by the goal of governmental stability. The least important goal was single-party government, with the other six options—including proportionality, a decisive outcome, minority representation, policy correspondence with the median voter, party cohesion, and women’s representation—clumped around the middle. With the exception of single-party government, all of these goals were rated, at the minimum and on average, to be “important.”

The goals valued by political scientists were correlated with their electoral system preferences. For example, people who valued proportionality more highly were more likely favorably to rate list-PR, mixed member compensatory, and STV electoral systems. People preferring decisive electoral outcomes were more favorable toward SMD-plurality and two-round systems as well as mixed-member parallel ones. These associations imply that political scientists are familiar and agree with the results of traditional research on electoral systems. Yet their priorities differed: whereas some political scientists upheld proportional visions of democracy, others preferred the majoritarian vision. 147

**What Political Scientists Do**

Our research found that political scientists work as electoral system engineers primarily by sharing knowledge about the consequences of different electoral rules and global trends in electoral reform. How and where we do this varies significantly. Some political scientists are intrepid travelers, visiting scores of countries to educate policy makers about electoral rules. Others work mostly at the global and regional levels, sharing information at seminars and conferences attended by stakeholders from multiple countries. Still others never need to leave home: they exert an impact by authoring policy briefs that influence discussions in national and international contexts.

**Policy Reports and Briefs**

Some of the most important work political scientists do involves writing policy reports and briefs that present typologies, explain theoretical findings, and summarize global and regional patterns. These reports may be very broad (such as Andrew Reynolds, Benjamin Reilly, and Andrew Ellis’s handbook on *Electoral System Design*) or very specific, containing information most relevant for specific issues or countries (such as Pippa Norris’s report on options for women’s reserved seats in Afghanistan or Mala Htun’s report on strategies to get more Afrodescendant women into elected office in Latin America). 148

**Presentations to Global and Regional Audiences**

Political scientists deliver presentations at global and regional meetings of policy makers, civic activists, and other stakeholders to inform them of cross-national patterns and present them with menus of options. At these meetings, political scientists supply frameworks and ideas that people can take back and put to use in their individual countries, often more successfully because they have a legitimate academic backing.

The global diffusion of gender quota policies is one area where political scientists working at the global and regional levels have had a broad impact. By attending meetings organized by international organizations and development banks—in addition to contributing to policy briefs and handbooks (such as International IDEA’s handbook on *Women in Parliament*)—scholars have helped to spread information about the quantity of countries with gender quotas, the details of the new laws, and their effects on getting women elected. This comparative knowledge has helped stakeholders understand why some quota laws work better than others and which aspects of poorly-functioning laws needed to be fixed.
Country Missions  In greater numbers, political scientists are traveling to individual countries to offer information and guidance, usually in seminars and smaller meetings, about options and consequences of electoral reform. Most trips are arranged by democracy-promotion organizations (such as the United States Agency for International Development [USAID], the International Foundation for Electoral Systems [IFES] or the National Democratic Institute [NDI]) but may also occur at the behest of national governments.

Much of the work political scientists do on these trips involves educating policy makers, civil society advocates, journalists, and others about varieties of electoral systems, their anticipated consequences, and real world experiences. John Carey, for example, has conducted crash courses running from one day to about a week for members of parliament in Yemen and Jordan, countries with limited democratic experience in a region with sparse history of competitive elections. In both cases, the executive branch had made a public commitment to send an electoral reform proposal to parliament, but most members of parliament themselves had little idea what the range of reform alternatives actually consisted of.

His job was not to advocate for a specific reform, but to provide actors on the ground with a grasp of basic concepts (for example, what a list-proportional system is, what a mixed system is, how various formulas for converting votes to seats operate). The politicians would later be asked to evaluate and approve (or disapprove or amend) electoral reform proposals. He helped them gain a broader understanding of the various electoral system design options—that is, what the potential menu looks like—and provided accounts of how various electoral systems have operated in other countries.

On the other hand, many political scientists do offer specific recommendations for reform. Jørgen Elklit helped convince members of the Lesotho parliament to support introduction of a mixed-member electoral system, for example. In many informal discussions stretching over a twenty-year period, Arend Lijphart pressed South Africans to adopt a list-PR system. During multiple trips to Israel, Simon Hix initially proposed a mixed-member electoral system and later, based on his scientific research with John Carey, a PR system with multi-member districts of between four and 11 seats. In a briefing to the Reeve Commission (charged with recommending constitutional changes for Fiji), Donald Horowitz proposed that AV might be suitable given the territorial intermixing of ethnic groups and the existence of more than one party per ethnic group. He reports that AV was subsequently adopted, with many exchanges of preference votes across ethnic lines in the 1999 elections.

During conference presentations and meetings with policy makers in Chile (one of the few Latin American countries without a gender quota law), Mala Htun proposed that they eschew a women’s quota and adopt a French-style gender parity law. Instead of granting women a right to representation as a particular social group, a parity law requires that candidates for elected office reflect the universal duality of the human condition as divided equally between men and women. Htun believed that the philosophical rationale behind parity—based on universal and individualist principles, not group rights—as well as its practical application (50/50) was more suitable to Chile’s political culture and two-member district electoral system than a 30 or 40 percent quota policy.

Training Staff of Democracy Promotion Organizations  Political scientists are often invited to provide training in electoral systems designs for the staff of democracy-promotion organizations. Shaheen Mozaffar, for example, has conducted workshops for USAID Democracy Officers based in Washington, DC, and in country missions. Similar to the “crash courses” offered by political scientists abroad, these workshops introduced senior staff to key features of different electoral systems, their effects on political life, and the ways they can be adapted to different contexts. Since Democracy Officers in country missions are often nationals of those countries, the workshops helped to create a cadre of people with locally-grounded knowledge of electoral systems.

On the Spot Policy Advice  Some political scientists receive urgent requests to offer advice and information to policy makers. Andy Reynolds reports receiving a phone call from the United Nations asking about how big the Liberian parliament should be. In addition, Andy Reynolds and John Carey authored a short paper for the National Security Council about Egypt’s electoral rules, which helped to raise awareness within the Obama administration about the implications of sticking with the majoritarian tendencies of the old Mubarak system.

What are the issues on which political science consultants are asked to weigh in? According to our second, short survey of political science consultants, in more than three-quarters of instances agendas included whether parliamentary elections should be single-winner or multiple-winner contests (or some combination of these), questions of the size and structure of electoral districts, the choice of electoral formula and thresholds for representation, and the design of ballot structure. More technical questions about the process of voter registration, election monitoring, vote counting, fraud, and arbitration lagged substantially in the consulting dossiers of our survey respondents. Increasingly, however, political scientists are turning, both as scientists and as engineers, to questions of electoral administration. Shaheen Mozaffar, for example, was a member of an international team of experts recruited by Elections Canada to provide technical assistance to the Interim Iraqi Election Commission. His task was to assess the organization and conduct of polling and vote counting...
in all three elections held in 2005, and his reports included recommendations for improving the process in subsequent elections.

More attention by political scientists to election administration issues will complement and enrich existing scholarship and enhance their real-world contributions as engineers. Good administration is crucial for securing the credibility of democratic elections. By establishing procedural certainty in the organization and conduct of electoral competition, good administration ensures the substantive uncertainty of electoral outcomes.\textsuperscript{154} In new democracies, voter perceptions of the fairness of electoral administration improves their perceptions of the freeness of elections. This helps to mitigate distrust among political actors and facilitate the acceptance of election results, especially by losers. Election administration affects the credibility of elections in established democracies as well. In the United States, controversies over the 2000 presidential election in Florida and the Supreme Court decision in \textit{Bush v. Gore}, not to mention sustained and acrimonious debate over voter registration and fraud, have motivated some observers to question the legitimacy of the electoral process.\textsuperscript{155}

\textbf{Do Political Scientists Make a Difference?}

By drawing on their theoretical knowledge and experience with electoral rules in multiple contexts, political scientists broaden the perspective of policy makers and other stakeholders and expand the menu of options available to them. As Pippa Norris puts it, what Western political scientists can bring to the table is familiarity with broader comparisons and generalizations so that parallels can be drawn between, say, gender quotas in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or local government and conflict management in Nepal and India or constitution-building in Sudan and Sub-Saharan Africa. It is understanding the broader picture which is so vital for electoral engineering, by widening the range of policy options on the table and giving local stakeholders an awareness of more potential solutions which can be found in comparable societies.\textsuperscript{156}

What did policy makers and other stakeholders do with the knowledge shared by political scientists? Were they merely enlightened by our presentation of global trends and theories, or did our work actually compel them to change their behavior? We have anecdotal evidence of the impact of political science ideas, including the adoption of AV in Fiji, PR in South Africa, and MMP in Lesotho, as well as the size of the Liberian parliament. We lack systematic evidence that political science knowledge compelled actors to choose courses of action they would not have taken otherwise. In fact, some of our evidence reveals the opposite: actors on the ground picked and chose among the scientific findings that were most useful to their purposes.

According to our survey of political scientists who had been on consulting missions abroad, local political actors were motivated primarily by partisan (or personal, sectarian movement) concerns, and inclined to draw on the content provided by academic consultants selectively, when that content could be used to bolster positions motivated by other factors.\textsuperscript{157} Simon Hix, for example, travelled to Israel on several occasions to propose options for electoral reform, but the opposition Likud party and several smaller parties repeatedly blocked change. The schemes under consideration—including raising the threshold for representation and introducing smaller districts—would have helped larger parties to gain more seats and stabilized coalition governments but would have harmed the smallest parties. The very problem Hix and others were invited to try to correct—the inflated power of small parties over coalition formation and stability—prevented them from making any progress.

This example highlights a broader issue in social science research: the difficulty of disentangling the effects of institutions from those of the conditions in which they are operating.\textsuperscript{158} Electoral rules, though commonly analyzed as a cause of party systems, are also its effect.\textsuperscript{159} Politicians want systems that preserve their positions and maximize their power. Reformers seek advice for various reasons, among which pursuit of the best science may not predominate. Political scientists can transmit their knowledge—and the discipline has produced many results relevant to reformers in recent decades—but reformers will deploy that knowledge to their own ends.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Many of the central areas of research in contemporary electoral studies map closely onto the issues on which electoral reformers seek guidance. More and more, international institutions, democracy-promotion organizations, and national governments are turning to political scientists to present them with options for reform and to educate them about the consequences of different electoral rules and regulations. Though reformers may not always follow expert advice, their choices are likely to be informed by political science research. By applying knowledge about the consequences of different electoral rules, political scientists make a broad impact on the world.

\textbf{Notes}

2 We are grateful to Paul Gronke for making the point about voting rights litigation.
5 Drometer and Rincke 2009. In addition, violations of electoral integrity produce racialized and gendered exclusion from politics. The discretionary use

6 Mill 1958 [1861].
7 Duverger 1954.
8 Rae 1967.
10 Cox 1997.
11 See also Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 7ff.
13 Our behavioral mechanism has its roots in the psychological effect described by Duverger 1954.
14 Schedler 2002a.
17 To avoid attributing too much significance to parties that receive few votes or seats, political scientists typically measure the number of parties by means of the effective number of parties (ENP) index, which gives little weight to parties with few votes or seats.
18 Duverger 1954.
19 Cox 1997.
20 See Ferrite 2011.
22 Horowitz 1985.
23 Ferrite, Gibson, and Hoffman 2011; Moser and Scheiner 2012; Moser, Scheiner, and Milazzo 2011.
24 Filippov, Orendshoek, and Shvetsova 1999; Grofman, Bowler, and Blais 2009; Moser and Scheiner 2012.
26 See, e.g., Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Cox 1997; Hicken 2009.
27 Ferrite, Powell, and Scheiner 2012.
29 Downs 1957.
31 Powell 2000; McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004.
33 Powell 2011.
36 Reynolds 2011, 89.
37 Matland and Studlar 1996, 709.
39 See also Bjarnegård 2013.
40 Matland and Studlar 1996.
44 Matland 1998.
45 Moser and Scheiner 2012; Moser 2001.
46 Reynolds 2010.
47 Matland 1993.
48 Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki, and Crisp 2010.
49 Moser and Scheiner 2012.
51 Moser 2008.
52 Reynolds 2011.
53 Kook 2009.
54 Célis, Kook, and Meier 2011.
55 Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006.
57 Bauer and Britton 2006; Waylen 2007.
60 Hughes, Kook, and Paxton 2012.
61 Bauer and Britton 2006; Bush 2011; Dahlerup 2006; Towns 2010.
62 Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds forthcoming.
63 Kook and O’Brien 2010.
68 Bird 2003.
71 Htun 2004.
72 Holmsten, Moser, and Slosar 2010.
74 Kook and O’Brien 2010.
75 Kook forthcoming.
76 Strolovitch 2006.
77 Hughes 2011, see also Htun and Ossa 2013.
78 Paxton and Hughes 2007.
79 Samuels and Shugart 2010.
80 Simplifying from Carey and Shugart 1995.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.; see also Shugart 2005.
83 This section draws substantially on André, Depauw, and Shugart 2013; Shugart is grateful to André and Depauw for agreeing to have some of this material reproduced here.
84 Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987.
85 Carey 2009.
87 Curtice and Shively 2009.
89 Strøm 1997, 162.
90 Carey and Shugart 1995, 430; Mitchell 2000; André and Depauw 2012.
91 Examples include involvement in casework or other contact with constituents (Bowler and Farrell 1993, Farrell and Scully 2007), frequent travel to the district (Ingall and Crisp 2001), sponsoring bills of local or other particularistic interest (Crisp et al. 2004), dissenting on legislative voting (Carey 2007), among others.
92 Crisp 2007.
93 See Bowler 2002.
94 Iversen and Soskice 2006, 2009, 2010; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007, 2010; Rogowski and Kayser 2002; Chang, Kayser, and Rogowski 2008; Linzer and Rogowski 2008; Chang, Kayser, Linzer, and Rogowski 2011; Persson and Tabellini 1999; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2007. See also Vernby 2007, which relies on vote-elasticity, à la Rogowski and co authors to explain different motivations for union behavior under SMD versus PR.
95 The contrast is particularly stark between Iversen and Soskice's 2006 analysis of reduction in Gini coefficients (income inequality) from before to after taxes and government transfers, and Chang et al.'s (2008) analysis of price and exchange rate ratios. In subsequent work, Iversen and Soskice 2009 broaden their analysis of redistribution to include regulatory policies on wage compression, education, and vocational training—all of which can be expected to affect relative price levels within an economy.
97 Rogowski and Kayser 2002.
98 According to Chang et al. 2011 producers are those who derived their livelihoods from industries where production costs and market positions (including the labor market) are shaped by government regulatory policies. Consumers are all others. Producers influence politicians with both votes and money, whereas consumers wield only votes. Producers, therefore, may always exercise leverage above their population share of the electorate, but the relative influence of consumers corresponds to the relative influence of each marginal vote on partisan fortunes. Higher vote-seat elasticity (under SMD), therefore, increases the influence of consumers on policy.
102 Iversen and Soskice 2006.
104 Ibid.
108 Amat and Wibbels 2009.
111 Funk and Gathmann 2010.
112 Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni 2011.
113 Evans 2009, Roelfsema 2004; Willman 2005. Kono 2009 suggests an interaction effect, in that small geographical constituencies (i.e., SMD) produce more protectionism when intra-industry trade is high.
114 Vernby 2007.
115 Rickard 2012a and 2012b.
116 Rickard 2010.
118 Neugart 2005.
119 Cf. Dickson 2009.
120 Park and Jensen 2007.
121 McGillivray 2003.
122 Cf. Rickard 2009, McGillivray 2003 also finds that stock price dispersion responds more quickly to electoral shifts, and to exogenous economic shocks, under SMD than PR systems.
123 Carey and Shugart 1995.
124 Hankla 2006; Crisp et al. 2010.
127 Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002.
128 Akitoby and Stratmann 2008.
Mommsen 1959. It bears noting that the electoral system for the Reichstag was a result of compromise, as are almost all matters of institutional design in practice, and that the highly proportional list-PR system was neither Preuss’s nor Weber’s sole handiwork.

This report refers primarily to the activities and experiences of U.S. based political scientists, with some exceptions.

By way of full disclosure, the authors of this report have been active in this area.


Our second survey shows that policy makers and actors on the ground similarly place the highest value on the goals of government stability and the accountability of individual representatives. They tended to consider, but did not deem a priority, other goals such as proportionality, the number of parties, the equal weighting of all votes, party cohesiveness, minority inclusion, and women’s representation. Note that the survey reports political scientists’ views of the goals of policy makers and other actors. It does not survey the policy makers directly.


According to our survey, although slightly less than half of the missions produced specific endorsements, consultants rarely (10 percent) refrained completely from offering recommendations. In 40 percent of cases, the recommendations took the shape of negative assessments of specific reform proposals on the table, although without an explicit endorsement of any specific reform solution.

Carey and Hix 2011.

Scott 2004.

References


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